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INTRODUCTION
Writers commonly observe that only through writing do they truly come to
understand their subject. The line “how do I know what I think until I see what I
say?” resonates so broadly that it has been attributed to, among others, E.M.
Forster, W.H. Auden, Raymond Carver, Oscar Wilde, Winston Churchill, and an
anonymous little girl.1 The suggestion is that the process of writing involves a
fundamentally deeper sort of engagement with one’s subject matter than is
possible through mere reflection or discussion, which in turn leads to better
comprehension and more rigorous thought. Judges frequently invoke a similar
sentiment via the phrase “it won’t write,”2 which refers to situations where a
1. For examples of such attributions, see Laura Apol, “What Do We Do if We Don’t Do Haiku?”
Seven Suggestions for Writers and Teachers, 91 ENG. J. 89, 90 (2002) (attributing the line to a “famous
poet”); Bruce Ballenger, Methods of Memory: On Native American Storytelling, 59 COLLEGE ENG. 789,
792 (1997) (attributing the line to Forster); Donald M. Murray, The Explorers of Inner Space, 58 ENG. J.
908, 908 (1969) (same); D. Shaw et al., Approaches to Sharing Knowledge in Group Problem
Structuring, 54 J. OPERATIONAL RES. SOC’Y 936, 947 (2003) (attributing the line to psychologist Karl
Weick); Alfred D. Sheffield, The Baseless Fabric of “Basic” Criticism, 6 COLLEGE ENG. 88, 88 (1944)
(attributing the line to an anonymous little girl); Postings to http://forum.quoteland.com/1/
OpenTopic?atpc&s586192041&f099191541&m4031943806&r3541085931 (last visited Jan.
17, 2008) (attributing the line to numerous sources).
2. See Thomas E. Baker, A Review of Corpus Juris Humorous, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 869, 873 (1993)
(“A decisionmaker who has reasoned through to a conclusion in print has reasoned in fact. Misconcep-
tions and oversights of fact and law are discovered in the process of writing. Everyone familiar with the
appellate process has heard the expression, ‘It won’t write that way,’ meaning that a tentative vote will
not withstand the careful disciplines of record reading, legal research, and opinion drafting.”); Richard
A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1447–48 (1995)
(“Reasoning that seemed sound ‘in the head’ may seem half-baked when written down, especially since
the written form of an argument encourages some degree of critical detachment in the writer, who in
reading what he has written will be wondering how an audience would react. Many writers have the
experience of not knowing except in a general sense what they are going to write until they start
writing. A link is somehow forged between the unconscious and the pen. The link is lost to the judge
who does not write.”); Alvin B. Rubin, Book Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 220, 227 (1981) (“Most
[judges], conditioned by our professionalism, our background, and our ideals, have had an experience
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result the judge initially thought appropriate turns out, upon an attempt to
justify the result in an opinion, to be unacceptable.
This insight accords with longstanding conceptions of the judicial role, in
which reasoned analysis stands as the core feature of legitimate judging.3 It also
suggests the possibility that preparation of a written opinion might be deemed
an essential component of a legitimate judicial decision.4 For if writing truly
does lead to better reasoning, and if the application of reason is the defining
feature of the judicial role, then it seems to follow that the process by which
judges reach decisions ought to incorporate writing. Indeed, this impulse per-
vades the legal profession. From the perspective of the legal academy, the
written opinion represents the archetypal judicial act—the principal mode of
legal instruction involves the study of judicial opinions, and a substantial
portion of legal scholarship focuses almost exclusively on the analysis and
critique of opinions. This same instinct extends into the profession more
generally, evidenced by strands of the recent debate over unpublished opinions5
and the occasional scoldings by appellate courts of trial court judges who have
failed to justify a decision.6
Yet despite the apparent strength of our collective professional intuition that
proper judging involves writing, it is plain that writing cannot be an essential
part of the act of judging. Or at least of all acts of judging. Many judicial
decisions of unquestioned legitimacy are unaccompanied by a written opinion,
ranging from evidentiary rulings made on the fly by a trial court judge to the
Supreme Court’s decisions not to grant certiorari. Nor are deviations from the
practice of providing an opinion inconsistent with some deeply rooted, histori-
cal tradition. The nearly exclusive practice in English courts—whose system of
course provided the template for our own—has long been for judges to provide
that Judge Coffin describes. We read the briefs, we study the record, we decide that we will affirm or
reverse, and we undertake to prepare an opinion stating the decision and its rationale. We find that ‘it
won’t write’—our jargon for saying that we cannot prepare an opinion reaching the desired result in
acceptable professional form.”)
3. See, e.g, Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366–67
(1978).
4. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 653 (1995) (noting the link
between the “it won’t write” concept and the ideal of rationality in judicial decisions).
5. For examples of the substantial number of articles addressing this debate, see Martha Dragich
Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235 (2004); Penelope
Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1435 (2004); Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the
Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399 (2002); Michael B.W.
Sinclair, Anastasoff versus Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential Authority
to Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 695 (2003).
6. E.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. Judicial Council
2005) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“It is wrong and highly abusive for a judge to exercise his power
without the normal procedures and trappings of the adversary system—a motion, an opportunity for the
other side to respond, a statement of reasons for the decision, reliance on legal authority.”); Bright v.
Westmoreland County, 380 F.3d 729, 731–32 (3d Cir. 2004) (castigating a district judge for adopting as
the court’s own an opinion prepared by one of the parties).
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largely extemporaneous, oral justifications for their decisions.7 The writing-
centered nature of the American system appears to have developed more as an
accommodation to practical necessities arising from such factors as the compara-
tively vast geography of the United States and a relative lack of trained
barristers than as the result of a considered decision concerning the appropriate
components of a properly functioning judiciary.8 But for these fortuities, we
might just as easily have a system in which judicial opinions were primarily
transcriptions of judicial speech rather than products of judicial writing.
This Article seeks to explore the significance of this historical accident and to
analyze the relationship between writing and judging. This, in turn, requires
consideration of the relationship between writing and reasoning. That relation-
ship turns out to be more complex than commonly imagined. Despite the
intuitive appeal of the sentiments recounted in the opening paragraph, one can
easily imagine that this relationship might not always be beneficial. Writing
might sometimes lead thought astray. Perhaps, for example, once one has
committed in writing to a particular path of analysis, the fact of writing (as
opposed to merely thinking or orally verbalizing) might blind one to alternative
paths and thus lead to a comparatively worse analysis.
To assess these possibilities, the Article reviews the developing psychological
research on the relationship between verbalization and problem solving,9 as
well as related research on the comparative strengths of conscious versus
unconscious information processing.10 That research suggests that the common
understanding concerning the utility of judicial opinions usually holds true. In
most cases the process of writing will improve the underlying decision, or at
worst will have no effect on it. But this is not always the case. Some types of
decisions are susceptible to what psychologists refer to as “verbal overshadow-
ing,”11 pursuant to which efforts to provide a verbal justification for a decision
have negative effects on its quality. One must of course exercise caution in
generalizing too broadly from the results of controlled experimentation based
on situations far outside the legal context.12 Still, it seems reasonable to
conclude based on this research that writing—or at least certain forms of
writing—could likewise have a negative effect on the quality of some judicial
decisions. Sometimes, in other words, requiring an opinion would lead to a
worse decision. Primarily these will be decisions that turn largely on the
assessment of complex, fact-intensive situations in which largely inarticulable,
7. See Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1159,
1171–78 (2004).
8. Id. at 1178–85.
9. See infra section III.D.
10. See infra section III.D.2.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 134–151.
12. See generally Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) (critiquing
“behavioral law and economics” scholarship based in part on its failure to account properly for the
limitations of the psychological research on which it is grounded).
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context-based judgments matter more than precision and technical analysis,13
the sorts of decisions, in other words, as to which judges often do not issue
opinions.
Of course, enhancement of decisional quality—however assessed—is only
one of the recognized functions of judicial opinions. Prior work has identified
two others—the creation and refinement of precedent14 and the legitimization of
judicial action.15 In general, this literature does not explore the nature of these
functions in great depth and has largely failed to consider the significance of the
written nature of opinions to their fulfillment. This Article attempts to advance
the discussion in both respects, by identifying and developing the contours of
the respective functions, including by considering how they might play out
differently at the trial and appellate levels, as well as by considering the extent
of writing’s contribution to the process.
The goal is not so much to generate definitive answers as to identify more
fully at a general level the costs and benefits provided by written opinions.
Doing so will help provide better grounding for ongoing debates over the
appropriate anatomy of the evolving judicial role.16 Pressures resulting from
caseload increases have led to dramatic changes in judges’ relationship to their
written opinions, with most judges more likely to serve as an editor of opinions
drafted by law clerks rather than as the originating author and with more cases
being disposed of without the benefit of an opinion.17 Such changes may be
inevitable, and even warranted, but it is nonetheless important to know what has
been lost in the transition. Under the traditional conception of the relationship
between writing, reasoning, and judging, something is always lost when a court
elects not to issue an opinion or when judges are not the actual authors of
opinions issued under their names. To be sure, any such losses might not
outweigh the gains from dispensing with writing, or from delegating the task to
clerks. For example, whatever benefits might accrue to the quality of an
evidentiary ruling were a judge required to provide a written explanation, such a
requirement would render trials exceedingly cumbersome. But the working
assumption seems to have been that an opinion’s contribution would be posi-
tive, and that whatever the strength of the force the three functions of opinions
would exert in any given situation, each would at the least be neutral and most
often pull in favor of a written justification. As it turns out, however, these
functions will at least occasionally stand in tension with one another, presenting
13. See infra section III.D.1.
14. See infra section IV.B.
15. See infra section IV.C.
16. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983); Chad
M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty To Decide, 94 GEO.
L.J. 121 (2005); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
17. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 140–60 (1996)
(discussing the roles and prevalence of law clerks in federal courts). Although I do not fully address the
role of law clerks in this Article, I offer some preliminary thoughts below. See infra text accompanying
notes 310–313.
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the possibility that an opinion could serve as a detriment. In a world of
increasingly scarce judicial resources, a better understanding of these relation-
ships is critical to the effective deployment of those resources.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly surveys the
existing standards, such as they are, governing courts’ determination of whether
to write an opinion with respect to a given decision. Part II outlines and
critiques the legal-philosophy literature addressing the question of whether there
is a distinction between the processes of judicial decision and the justification of
such decisions. Part III surveys the research from psychology and related fields
concerning the effects of verbalization on problem-solving effectiveness. Part
IV integrates the insights from Parts II and III with prior work on the functions
of opinions, with particular emphasis on the extent to which the written nature
of judicial opinions is important to the fulfillment of those functions. Part V
considers the differing applicability of the analysis to trial versus appellate
courts. Finally, the Conclusion draws on all of what precedes to sketch out some
additional implications of the analysis, to offer some tentative reforms, and to
outline future avenues for exploration.
I. STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ISSUANCE OF OPINIONS
Prior to departing into a more theoretical consideration of the role of judicial
opinions, we must pause to consider existing standards governing courts’
issuance of opinions. Having those standards in mind will help to focus the
inquiry, both by highlighting the factors that courts have identified as important
to the determination of whether an opinion should be issued in a given case and
by revealing the absence of other factors that might seem to be of equal
importance.
The backdrop against which these standards must be viewed is one in which
courts contend with ever-increasing caseloads.18 Today’s federal appellate judge,
for example, faces a workload many times greater than that of her counterpart
of fifty years ago.19 Although the courts have accommodated this increase with
a number of procedural modifications, perhaps the most prominent is the
increased use of so-called “unpublished” opinions, which require less effort to
generate, coupled with greater receptiveness to disposing of some cases with no
18. For an overview of this phenomenon in the appellate context, see DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL.,
APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 385–419 (2006); see also
Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the “Crisis of Volume,” 8 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 101 (2006); Richard A. Posner, Demand and Supply Trends in Federal and State Courts over
the Last Half Century, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 133 (2006).
19. The caseload of the federal courts of appeals in 2003 was more than fifteen times greater than in
1960. Compare OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASE-
LOAD STATISTICS 2003 23 tbl.B-1 (2003) (60,661 cases commenced), with DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S.
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 210
tbl.B-1 (1961) (3,899 cases commenced).
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opinion at all.20 In the eyes of at least some judges, the practical need to process
cases is the only legitimate basis for truncating or dispensing with the opinion at
the appellate level.21
As the discussion in this Part reveals, the primary concept at work in formal
standards governing the issuance of opinions is that of discretion. Subject to
occasional, largely ad hoc requirements that courts write opinions in certain
specified situations, judges at both the trial and appellate levels operate under, at
most, loosely articulated guidelines that enable them to dispense with a written
opinion upon nothing more than the court’s conclusion that an opinion is not
required.
A. TRIAL COURTS
A moment’s reflection reveals that trial judges need not provide opinions
supporting every decision they make. To take just one example, a judge making
an evidentiary ruling in the course of a trial rarely pauses to give the matter
sustained consideration, much less to provide a written account of the reasoning
underlying the ruling. But not all evidentiary rulings are made in this fashion—
the resolution of a pre-trial motion in limine might be explained in a written
opinion, particularly if the question it resolves is dispositive (such as a ruling on
the admissibility of expert testimony). Other decisions might be accompanied
by an oral explanation, but still no writing. A host of variables seemingly factor
into the determination, including the centrality of the issue under consideration
to the lawsuit, whether the requirement of a decision arises at a stage in the case
where it must be made quickly (as at trial), the relative ease of resolution, and
the like.
Not surprisingly, trial judges work under an understood, though generally
unarticulated, standard pursuant to which the question of whether to write an
opinion in connection with any given decision lies squarely within a judge’s
discretion.22 There are some specific exceptions. For example, some jurisdic-
20. See, e.g., John B. Oakley, Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Endangered or
Invasive Species?, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 123, 124 (2006). For a short history of the unpublished
opinion, including its relationship to the crisis of volume, see John P. Borger & Chad M. Oldfather,
Anastastoff v. United States and the Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 899,
901–04 (2001).
21. See Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of Precedent, 4
GREEN BAG (n.s.) 17, 19 (2000) (suggesting that “[t]he practical need to dispose of a certain percentage
of cases on an expedited basis” is the only basis for the use of unpublished opinions, and that “[t]here is
no strictly legal—let alone philosophical—justification for the practice”).
22. See JOYCE GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 72 (4th ed. 2000). For most courts in
most contexts, the idea that trial judges enjoy this discretion as a default position is an unarticulated
assumption. There are, however, a few situations where the concept is made explicit. See, e.g., FED. R.
CIV. P. 52(a) (“It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law [made by a trial court
following a bench trial] are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence
or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c)
(providing, in bench trials in criminal cases, that “[i]f a party requests before the finding of guilty or not
guilty, the court must state its specific findings of fact in open court or in a written decision or
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tions require trial judges to provide written justifications for departures from a
presumptive sentence under sentencing guidelines.23 Some district courts re-
quire by local rule the issuance of written justifications in connection with the
disposition of habeas petitions.24 More generally, and more colorfully, one
judge has written of “woodshed avoidance”25 reasons for writing opinions,
including not only those situations where statutes require the issuance of an
opinion but also those in which a trial court must demonstrate to an appellate
court that it has exercised its discretion in an appropriate manner.26 For the most
part, however, trial judges enjoy a broad ability to dispense with a written
justification as they see fit.
These relatively sparse standards pertaining to trial judges’ discretion to write
are matched by an equally thin body of commentary. “Debate” might be too
strong a word to characterize the occasional advocacy related to whether there
ought to be relatively more or fewer oral dispositions. Some judges have argued
that oral rulings ought to be utilized whenever possible, with writing reserved
for limited categories of cases.27 Others are more skeptical of oral disposi-
tions.28 But nobody suggests that either form of decision should be used
exclusively, and everyone acknowledges that there are certain situations in
which written decisions are appropriate.
opinion”). And at least some courts have expressly recognized this general discretion. See, e.g., R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Kenyon, 882 So. 2d 986, 989 (Fla. 2004) (noting the Florida Supreme Court’s
lack of “authority to require a district court to write an opinion when the district court has determined
that no opinion is necessary”).
23. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 2 (2002) (“Whether or not a sentencing hearing is requested
pursuant to subdivision 1, the district court shall make written findings of fact as to the reasons for
departure from the Sentencing Guidelines in each case in which the court imposes or stays a sentence
that deviates from the Sentencing Guidelines applicable to the case.”).
24. See N.D. CAL. CIV. R. 2254–9 (requiring all rulings on habeas petitions to be in written form).
This is not a universal position. See S.D. CAL. CIV. R. HC3(j) (providing that a court’s ruling on a
habeas petition may be made in writing or orally on the record).
25. The phrase plays off the expression “taken to the woodshed” as a euphemism for punishment.
See, e.g., Murray Chass, Bad Boys III: A Week with Nothing but Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, § 8,
at 2 (“Wells, the portly portsider who pitches for Boston, was taken to the woodshed and spanked last
week for his tirade against Commissioner Bud Selig and assorted others after his unsuccessful appeal of
his six-game suspension.”); Nicholas D. Kristof, The 2000 Campaign: The 1988 Campaign; For Bush,
Thrill Was in Father’s Chase, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at A1 (“‘He was the disciplinarian,’
remembered Andy Card, another aide. ‘I’m blessed that I never got taken to the woodshed. But if you
were a disappointment to the campaign, he would let you know that you were a disappointment.’”).
26. See John B. Nesbitt, The Role of Trial Court Opinions in the Judicial Process, N.Y. ST. BAR J.,
Sept. 2003, at 39. Of course, such justification may be and often is provided orally on the record. One
can imagine, however, that just as a written opinion might come across as more authoritative to the
parties, so might it to an appellate court.
27. See ROBERT E. KEETON, KEETON ON JUDGING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 199 (1999); Robert
O. Lukowsky, The Case for the Oral Decision, 4 TRIAL JUDGES’ J. 3, 3 (1965); see also Reuben Lozner,
Oral Versus Written Opinions, 13 JUDGES’ J. 94, 94 (1974) (advocating increased use of oral opinions by
administrative judges). Nesbitt quotes one judge who opined, “[W]e were elected to make decisions,
not explain them. Don’t over-think this stuff.” Nesbitt, supra note 26, at 39. Another offered “the
aphorism that one should not write when one can talk, and not talk when one doesn’t have to.” Id.
28. See, e.g., David Harris, The Case for the Written Decision—A Reply, 5 TRIAL JUDGES’ J. 6, 24
(1966).
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Beyond that, broad areas of agreement exist concerning a few rules of thumb
applicable to making the decision whether to write. Timing will often be
determinative. Some decisions by their very nature must be made quickly,
cannot wait for the trial judge to work through writing a memorandum or
opinion, and are not so momentous as to justify the commitment necessary for
the court to issue an opinion on an expedited basis.29
The nature of the case likewise matters. If the record on which a court must
base its decision is large or complex, or requires the resolution of significant
evidentiary conflicts, most commentators suggest the use of a written justifica-
tion on the grounds that doing so allows the judge to sharpen the analysis.30
Writing might also be necessary in such cases for the court to effectively
communicate its decision.31 In a similar vein, these commentators suggest that
opinions are unnecessary in simple cases involving few issues.32 Judge Robert
Keeton suggests writing opinions or memoranda “only when the issue is close
and you need to explain why you have rejected arguments advanced by the
loser.”33
Trial judges must also be mindful of the future role their decision might play.
The prospect of an appeal might tip the scales in favor of writing in cases
presenting a close issue or where the trial judge might otherwise want to present
her position to the appellate court in the most effective way.34 On a somewhat
broader level, there are institutional reasons why trial judges might want to take
the time to write. By virtue of being on the legal system’s “front lines,” trial
judges enjoy a perspective that appellate judges do not. Novel issues necessarily
present themselves first to trial judges, who consequently have the ability, and
arguably the responsibility, to direct appellate courts’ attention to unsettled
issues.35 Moreover, by virtue of their greater contact with the parties and longer
exposure to the course of litigation, trial judges have a different, and arguably
better, sense of how the possible resolutions before an appellate court will work
in the course of implementation both within the context of the case at hand and
more broadly throughout the affected portions of the legal system. Because trial
judges bear significant responsibility for that implementation, they have an
incentive to share their views with the appellate court in cases that are likely to
result in the making of new law.
Trial judges themselves may be involved in the making of law, at least in an
29. See Lozner, supra note 27, at 94.
30. See GEORGE, supra note 22, at 72; Lozner, supra note 27, at 94.
31. See GEORGE, supra note 22, at 72.
32. See id.; Lozner, supra note 27, at 94.
33. KEETON, supra note 27, at 199.
34. See GEORGE, supra note 22, at 72 (suggesting that where the trial judge expects an appeal, “there
is a need to explain to the appellate court the thought process and the reasoning behind the decision. If
the decision is so self-evident that it needs no support, it may be better suited to an oral presentation”).
35. See Nesbitt, supra note 26, at 40.
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informal sense. To be sure, trial court rulings have limited precedential effect.36
But in certain sorts of large and unusual cases, the approach taken by the first
trial court serves as a template, based on which similar, future cases are
structured.37 In these cases, a trial judge might elect to write so as to provide
future courts and litigants with a starting point for the resolution of the cases
they face.
B. APPELLATE COURTS
In the appellate context, it is not so apparent that some decisions may
properly be made without an accompanying opinion. Indeed, as evidenced by
the recent debate over so-called “unpublished” opinions, many lawyers, judges,
and academics strongly believe not merely that appellate courts should always
issue opinions but also that those opinions should always be accorded preceden-
tial value.38 Whatever the sway of these expectations on courts’ behavior, at
bottom the standard governing appellate issuance of opinions parallels that for
trial courts—the determination of whether to write an opinion lies in the
discretion of the court.39
This discretion does not go unexercised. Many appellate courts allow them-
selves to dispose of some portion of their cases via summary orders—that is,
one-sentence memoranda stating simply that the case is affirmed. Indeed, some
courts have used this as their principal means of docket management. The Third
Circuit, for example, disposed of roughly sixty percent of its caseload via
summary orders in the period from 1989 to 1996.40
Still, and in contrast to trial courts, the courts of appeals tend to have written
standards setting forth the types of situations in which the court can dispense
with a written opinion. Some courts have adopted rules identifying specific
types of cases in which the use of a summary disposition is appropriate. For
example, the Third Circuit’s internal operating procedures include a chapter
36. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial Power To
“Unpublish” Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 168 (2001) (“It is commonly accepted that federal
district court decisions are treated like unpublished appellate decisions: they may be disregarded in
future cases except for the purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel.”).
37. See generally David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and
Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015 (2004) (suggesting that much of what counts as law in
institutional-reform litigation comes about through a process of transjudicial administration, in which
repeat players pattern litigation based on similar past cases rather than in response to legal standards
imposed by higher courts).
38. See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219,
222 (1999).
39. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972) (“We, of course, agree that the courts of
appeals should have wide latitude in their decisions of whether or how to write opinions. That is
especially true with respect to summary affirmances.”); see also DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF
APPEALS MANUAL § 33.2 (4th ed. 2000) (“The court may decide your appeal without an opinion or may
elect not to release its opinion for publication. In either event, there is little you can do about [it].”).
40. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1998, at 157, 162.
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devoted to judgment orders.41 The rules provide that a panel of the court may
dispose of a case by a judgment order where the panel is unanimous, where the
panel affirms or declines to review the decision being appealed, and where the
panel “determines that a written opinion will have no precedential or institu-
tional value.”42 In addition, Procedure 6.2.2 provides:
A judgment order may be used when:
(a) The judgment of the district court is based on findings of fact which are
not clearly erroneous;
(b) Sufficient evidence supports a jury verdict;
(c) Substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports a decision or
order of an administrative agency;
(d) No error of law appears;
(e) The district court did not abuse its discretion on matters addressed
thereto; or
(f) The court has no jurisdiction.43
The Fifth,44 Eighth,45 Ninth,46 and Federal Circuits47 have similarly detailed rules.
41. See 3D CIR. I.O.P. 6.1–6.4.
42. Id. at 6.2.1.
43. Id. at 6.2.2. Notably, a judgment order need not be completely summary, in the sense that it can
include some reference to authority. Section 6.3.2 provides: “A judgment order may state that the case
is affirmed by reference to the opinion of the district court or decision of the administrative agency and
may contain one or more references to cases or other authorities.” Id. at 6.3.2.
44. The Fifth Circuit’s rules state:
The judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced without opinion when the court deter-
mines that an opinion would have no precedential value and that any one or more of the
following circumstances exists and is dispositive of a matter submitted for decision: (1) that a
judgment of the district court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous; (2)
that the evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient; (3) that the order of an
administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; (4) in the
case of a summary judgment, that no genuine issue of material fact has been properly raised
by the appellant; and (5) no reversible error of law appears. In such case, the court may, in its
discretion, enter either of the following orders: “AFFIRMED. See 5th Cir. R. 47.6.” or
“ENFORCED. See 5th Cir. R. 47.6.”
5TH CIR. R. 47.6.
45. Eighth Circuit Rule 47B provides:
A judgment or order appealed may be affirmed or enforced without an opinion if the court
determines an opinion would have no precedential value and any of the following circum-
stances disposes of the matter submitted to the court for decision: (1) a judgment of the district
court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous; (2) the evidence in support of
a jury verdict is not insufficient; (3) the order of an administrative agency is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (4) no error of law appears.
8TH CIR. R. 47B.
46. Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2 provides:
A written, reasoned disposition shall be designated as an OPINION only if it: (a) Establishes,
alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law, or (b) Calls attention to a rule of law which appears
to have been generally overlooked, or (c) Criticizes existing law, or (d) Involves a legal or
factual issue of unique interest or substantial public importance, or (e) Is a disposition of a
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The remaining federal courts of appeals employ somewhat more general
guidelines. Seventh Circuit Rule 32.1 states simply, “It is the policy of the
circuit to avoid issuing unnecessary opinions.”48 The First Circuit is forthright
about its inability to issue opinions in every case, but opaque about how it
determines which cases get summary treatment. Local Rule 36 provides:
The volume of filings is such that the court cannot dispose of each case by
opinion. Rather it makes a choice, reasonably accommodated to the particular
case, whether to use an order, memorandum and order, or opinion. An opinion
is used when the decision calls for more than summary explanation.49
The Second Circuit’s rule provides:
The demands of contemporary case loads require the court to be conscious of
the need to utilize judicial time effectively. Accordingly, in those cases in
which decision is unanimous and each judge of the panel believes that no
jurisprudential purpose would be served by an opinion (i.e., a ruling having preceden-
tial effect), the ruling may be by summary order instead of by opinion.50
The Fourth,51 Sixth,52 Tenth,53 and D.C. Circuits54 have similarly general
case in which there is a published opinion by a lower court or administrative agency, unless
the panel determines that publication is unnecessary for clarifying the panel’s disposition of
the case, or (f) Is a disposition of a case following a reversal or remand by the United States
Supreme Court, or (g) Is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissenting expression, and
the author of such separate expression requests publication of the disposition of the Court and
the separate expression.
9TH CIR. R. 36-2.
47. The Federal Circuit’s rule provides:
The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion, citing this rule, when it
determines that any of the following conditions exist and an opinion would have no preceden-
tial value: (a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is based on
findings that are not clearly erroneous; (b) the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict is
sufficient; (c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on the
pleadings; (d) the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance under the standard
of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review; or (e) a judgment or decision has
been entered without an error of law.
FED. CIR. R. 36.
48. 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(a).
49. 1ST CIR. R. 36.0.
50. 2D CIR. R. 0.23.
51. Fourth Circuit Procedure 36.3 provides:
If all judges on a panel of the Court agree following oral argument that an opinion in a case
would have no precedential value, and that summary disposition is otherwise appropriate, the
Court may decide the appeal by summary opinion. A summary opinion identifies the decision
appealed from, sets forth the Court’s decision and the reason or reasons therefor, and resolves any
outstanding motions in the case. It does not discuss the facts or elaborate on the Court’s reasoning.
4TH CIR. I.O.P. 36.3.
52. Sixth Circuit Rule 36 provides:
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standards. The Eleventh Circuit presently has no standard, having rescinded its
rule entitled “Affirmance Without Opinion” on the ground that “only a
min[u]scule portion of appeals are currently terminated in this manner.”55
C. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
Despite the relative sparseness of existing standards governing when courts
should issue written opinions, some generalization is possible. In both the trial
and appellate contexts, there is clear evidence of a cost-benefit analysis at work.
It is only a slight overstatement to suggest that the standards evoke images of
judges who will grudgingly issue opinions when it is necessary to do so, but
who generally view the gains associated with an opinion as unworthy of the
effort. Such an attitude is not hard to fathom, given the caseloads facing judges
at both levels.56
Even so, it seems clear that there is, in general, a reduced expectation that a
trial court will issue an opinion, to the point where some district judges have an
announced policy of using oral dispositions as their default means of issuing
In those cases in which the decision is unanimous and each judge of the panel believes that no
jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion, disposition of the case may be
made in open court following oral argument. A written judgment shall be signed and entered
by the clerk in accordance with the decision of the panel from the bench. Counsel may obtain
from the clerk a copy of the transcript of the decision as it was announced from the bench.
6TH CIR. R. 36.
53. Tenth Circuit Rule 36.1 provides:
The court does not write opinions in every case. The court may dispose of an appeal or
petition without written opinion. Disposition without opinion does not mean that the case is
unimportant. It means that the case does not require application of new points of law that
would make the decision a valuable precedent.
10TH CIR. R. 36.1.
54. District of Columbia Circuit Rule 36(b) provides:
The court may, while according full consideration to the issues, dispense with published
opinions where the issues occasion no need therefor, and confine its action to such abbreviated
disposition as it may deem appropriate, e.g., affirmance by order of a decision or judgment of
a court or administrative agency, a judgment of affirmance or reversal, containing a notation
of precedents or accompanied by a brief memorandum.
D.C. CIR. R. 36(b).
55. Memorandum from Thomas K. Kahn, Clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
(Apr. 2006) (on file with author). The court’s prior rule 36-1 stated:
When the court determines that any of the following circumstances exist: (a) the judgment of
the district court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous; (b) the evidence in
support of a jury verdict is sufficient; (c) the order of an administrative agency is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; (d) a summary judgment, directed verdict, or
judgment on the pleadings is supported by the record; (e) the judgment has been entered
without a reversible error of law; and an opinion would have no precedential value, the
judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced without opinion.
11TH CIR. R. 36-1 (rescinded 2006).
56. For an overview of the growth in federal caseloads since 1960, see POSNER, supra note 17, at
53–86.
2008] 1295WRITING, COGNITION, AND THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
their rulings.57 And the articulated factors for trial courts to consider in determin-
ing whether to write opinions, such as the need for a speedy disposition, an
especially complex case, or the more general notion of “woodshed avoidance,”
all seem to be largely oriented toward what the individual judge might feel
compelled to do in the context of a given case. Consideration of the institutional
or systemic benefits that might flow from an opinion seemingly takes a back
seat to individual expediency.
Standards at the appellate level suggest that the baseline assumption is that
the court will issue an opinion, and that that assumption would be universally
satisfied if only there were enough time. But “the demands of contemporary
case loads”58 do not allow for such a luxury, and the appellate courts must
accordingly dispense with opinions in some portion of their cases. A review of
these standards reveals that courts have had considerable difficulty articulating
useful guidelines to govern that determination. Some of the standards acknowl-
edge that “jurisprudential”59 or other institutional60 considerations come into
play, but do not define what those might be. Attempts to be more specific have
likewise proved troublesome. For example, by its terms, Section 6.2.2 of the
Third Circuit’s internal operating procedures would seemingly allow the court
to dispense with an opinion in any case where it affirms the decision of the
district court.61
The existence of differing expectations and practices regarding judicial writ-
ing at the two levels of the judicial hierarchy ought not to trouble us, for the
courts involved have differing functions. Viewed as a whole, the judiciary
serves two primary purposes: First, to provide a peaceful mechanism for the
resolution of disputes;62 and second, to generate and clarify legal standards
applicable to present and future disputes.63 But responsibility for these larger
systemic functions is not allocated evenly amongst the judiciary’s tiers. In the
typical conception of the American judicial system, trial courts primarily serve
the first function, while appellate courts primarily serve the second.64
These differing functions suggest that different considerations ought to drive
the determination of whether to generate an opinion in each of the two contexts.
To the extent that trial courts provide the first and best forum for dispute
resolution, trial judges ought to focus on whether an opinion will further that
mission in any given context. In this regard it is peculiar that prior discussions
57. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
58. See supra text accompanying note 50.
59. See 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 6TH CIR. R. 36.
60. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 36.0; D.C. CIR. R. 36(b).
61. Indeed, for a time that was very nearly the approach the court took. See generally Gulati &
McCauliff, supra note 40; see also 3D CIR. I.O.P. 6.2.2.
62. See Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937–38 (1975);
Ellen E. Sward, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 303–06 (1989).
63. See Scott, supra note 62, at 938–40; Sward, supra note 62, at 306–08.
64. For a general overview of the division of responsibility between trial and appellate courts, see
MEADOR ET AL., supra note 18, at 1–9.
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of the appropriateness of written opinions in trial courts have largely ignored
the question of whether the process of generating an opinion will lead to better
results, however measured, in some category of decisions typically faced by
trial judges. If, for example, there is reason to believe that writing is especially
helpful in resolving, say, credibility disputes, then the standards relating to trial
court opinions should emphasize their usefulness in that context.
In the appellate context, in contrast, the inquiry ought to be somewhat
different. Here, at least according to the standard account, the institutional role
involves less emphasis on dispute resolution and more emphasis on the develop-
ment and maintenance of legal standards, with the latter dominating the focus of
courts of last resort.65 Here, too, the relationship between the writing process
and decisional quality is significant, but in a different way. Now the concern is
perhaps less about writing’s tendency to facilitate the accurate determination of
largely historical questions—whether Party A’s conduct ran afoul of Legal Rule
X—and more about its effect on the generation and articulation of appropriate
legal standards.
To be sure, there are additional factors that will bear on the need for a written
opinion. I have already suggested that simple expediency is one. Maintenance
of the perceived legitimacy of the judicial system is another. These consider-
ations must certainly be factored into the mix. Before returning to these
considerations, however, this Article will consider the question of what written
opinions contribute that other forms of justification, or no justification at all,
might not, as well as how those contributions might relate to institutional
function. Such an analysis might, among other things, provide the basis for
more precisely calibrated standards for when courts should write.
II. THE DECISION-JUSTIFICATION DISTINCTION
Our inquiry begins with a fundamental question: what is the nature of the
relationship between judicial decisionmaking and judicial opinion writing? If
the two are distinct processes, it may be that one is relatively less important. If a
distinction exists, and if we are concerned primarily about having a judicial
system that generates good decisions, then we might be concerned about
opinions only to the extent that they facilitate the process of good decisionmak-
ing. Alternatively, we might be more concerned about generating good opinions—
for example, on the theory that the opinion is the most enduring product of a
lawsuit—in which case our emphasis ought to be reversed. And, as the preced-
ing Part suggests, our sense of the relative importance of the two components
might vary situationally according to where we stand in the judicial hierarchy.
On the other hand, we might conclude that opinion writing is an integral part of
the judicial decisionmaking process, and that it is therefore meaningless to
speak of a distinction between the two. But this conclusion, too, might be
65. See id. at 4–6.
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situational. Perhaps, for example, this integral relationship holds only for
decisions likely to have meaningful precedential effect.
A. DECIDING VERSUS JUSTIFYING
Although there is not extensive literature on the subject, most treatments of
the topic of judicial opinion writing take the position that the process of opinion
writing is distinct from that of making the decision that the opinion serves to
justify.66 Richard Wasserstrom undertook the first extensive consideration of the
matter. He began with the observation that judicial opinions bear considerable
similarity to one another in that they almost uniformly purport to describe a
deductive process of decisionmaking.67 As Wasserstrom put it:
It is one of the curious features of Anglo-American case law that regardless of
the way in which a given decision is actually reached, the judge apparently
feels it necessary to make it appear that the decision was dictated by prior
rules applied in accordance with canons of formal logic.68
From this, Wasserstrom argued that judicial decisionmaking involves two dis-
tinct components.69 The first is making the decision, which he refers to as the
“process of discovery.”70 The second is justifying the decision in terms of the
appropriate legal standards, which he calls the “process of justification.”71
Wasserstrom suggested that these processes have no necessary relation to one
another.72 A judge might stumble onto a decision by chance, or might be
66. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 548 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter ALDISERT,
PROCESS] (“[T]he judicial resolution of a legal dispute implicates two separate processes: (1) deciding,
or the process of discovering the conclusion, and (2) justifying, or the process of public exposition of
that conclusion.”); RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 31–34 (1990) (examining “a concept not
widely acknowledged, or even recognized—the distinction between making a decision and justifying
it”); BRUCE ANDERSON, “DISCOVERY” IN LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 1 (1996) (characterizing the contempo-
rary, positivist view of legal reasoning as accepting “that there is, and should be, a ‘rigid’ distinction
between the process of discovery (how a judge ‘actually’ reaches a tentative decision) and the process
of justification (how a judge publicly justifies a decision).”). But see David McGowan, Judicial Writing
and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 513 (2001) (disagreeing with the
suggestion that writing and deciding can be separated).
67. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
16–17 (1961). A suggestion that appears frequently in the literature is that the dominant style of judicial
opinions, typified by self-avowed constraint and a high degree of confidence, does not accurately reflect
the process by which the decisions were reached. See, e.g., Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of
Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 8–12 (1998).
68. WASSERSTROM, supra note 67, at 16–17.
69. Id. at 25.
70. Id. at 26–27.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 27. Although there is no necessary relationship between discovery and justification in the
context of any particular decision, Wasserstrom notes that, in a larger sense, there is likely to be an
asymmetrical relationship between them. “That is to say, a procedure of discovery may be adopted if it
succeeds in ‘generating’ more conclusions that can be justified within the accepted logic of justification
than any other discovery procedure.” Id.
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inspired by something completely external to the law, such as a flash of insight
while gazing at the sunset. An opinion describing that process would tell us how
he reached his decision, but it would not speak to whether the decision was
justified. Wasserstrom argued that this not only demonstrates the distinction
between decision and justification, but also undermines any criticism of judicial
opinions based on their failure to provide an accurate description of the decision-
making process.73 That, he contends, is not their purpose, which is instead to
demonstrate that a decision is valid in light of existing authority.74 Indeed,
Wasserstrom argues that “[t]o insist—as many legal philosophers appear to have
done—that a judicial opinion is an accurate description of the decision process
there employed if and only if it faithfully describes the procedure of discovery
is to help to guarantee that the opinion will be found wanting.”75
Martin Golding further develops this conception of judging by analogy to the
process of scientific discovery.76 Golding draws on philosophy of science, in
which the distinction between discovery and justification is frequently illus-
trated by chemist Friedrich August Kekule von Stradonitz’s “account of how the
idea of representing the molecular structure of benzene by a hexagonal ring
came to him while dozing in front of his fireplace and seeing the flames dancing
about in snake-like arrays.”77 Despite the clear relevance of this story to any
inquiry into how hypotheses are generated, it is not helpful in answering the
question whether a hexagonal ring is a scientifically valid representation of the
benzene molecule. In a similar fashion, a judge might have the resolution of a
case occur to her in a flash of insight triggered by some stimulus external to the
law. But, Golding reasons, the appropriateness of that result can only be
demonstrated by reference to justifying reasons.78 The judicial opinion thus
serves a function analogous to experimentation in science in that it provides a
mechanism for testing the validity of a hypothesis.79 And this justification is, for
Golding, the only significant part of the process. He acknowledges that “it
would be unfortunate if a judge’s argument was a mere rationalization and if the
judge did not sincerely hold the reasons he explicitly gives. But in an important
respect this fact, whenever it is a fact, is irrelevant to the justifiability of the
decision.”80 Thus Golding draws a distinction between “explanatory” and “justi-
fying” reasons, with only the latter being of significance. “The crucial question
73. Id. at 28–29.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 28.
76. Martin P. Golding, A Note on Discovery and Justification in Science and Law, in JUSTIFICATION
124, 124–25 (J. Roland Pennock & John H. Chapman eds., 1986).
77. Id. at 125.
78. See MARTIN P. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 2 (1983).
79. Id. at 2–3; Golding, supra note 76, at 134 (“The ‘testing’ of a proposed decision, so to speak,
occurs in the ‘rationalization’ given in the opinion, that is, in the argument that shows that the decision
can be inferred from correct propositions of law.”). For a detailed critique of science-law analogy, see
ANDERSON, supra note 66, at 39–52.
80. GOLDING, supra note 78, at 8.
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is whether the given reasons are adequate to establish the conclusions, and not
whether they were the products of hunch, bias, or personal value-predisposi-
tion.”81
B. CRITIQUES OF THE DISTINCTION
The decision-justification distinction is subject to two primary critiques. The
first stems from the notion that the distinction relies too heavily on objectivity
and certainty in law. The suggestion that we need not worry about judges’ actual
motivations so long as their decisions can be justified by reference to law
assumes that the law is settled and meaningfully constrains judicial decisionmak-
ing. But the law is not always settled, not only in the sense that some questions
remain unresolved but also in the sense that, not infrequently, parallel lines of
authority will appear to govern the resolution of a given issue in conflicting
ways.82 More generally, the Legal Realists long ago demonstrated that even
“settled” law allows judges room in which to maneuver.83 One need not accept
the proposition that law provides no constraint at all in order to reach the
conclusion that opinions justifying decisions in accordance with “objective”
legal standards might mask decisions motivated by non-legal, and potentially
improper, considerations.84
It is this last point that is most significant. Insofar as the functions of judicial
opinions include those of providing guidance to parties who must structure their
affairs in accordance with law and judges who must render decisions in
accordance with law,85 it is important that judicial opinions speak as fully and
candidly as they can to why the court decided as it did.86 If a court issues
opinions that speak only of doctrine where doctrine does not capture all of the
factors driving its decisions, parties and judges looking to act in such a way as
not to run afoul of that court will lack all the information they need in order to
do so. A lower court judge might follow the letter of the law perfectly. But if in
81. Golding, supra note 76, at 128.
82. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1394 (1995) (noting the existence within a single jurisdiction of
distinct “winning” and “losing” formulations of what purports to be the same legal standards).
83. For an overview of Legal Realism, see Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261–79 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999).
84. See ANDERSON, supra note 66, at 4 (arguing that “different logical justifications could be used to
justify conflicting outcomes. Hence the indeterminacy of formal decision-making leaves open the
question of substantive elements being the real determinants of the decision”).
85. See Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation,
58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 787–93 (2006) (discussing the functions of judicial opinions). Indeed, Golding
expressly acknowledges these functions. See GOLDING, supra note 78, at 9–10.
86. For discussions of the significance of candor in judicial decisionmaking, see Scott Altman,
Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial
Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995); Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV.
721 (1979); Oldfather, supra note 16, at 155–60; Micah Schwartzman, The Principle of Judicial
Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2008); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor,
100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78
GEO. L.J. 353 (1989).
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doing so she fails to account for a higher court’s unarticulated preferences—
whether they be based on equitable assessments or on more clearly improper
factors such as a party’s race or economic status—she might, nonetheless, find
herself being reversed. Put another way, if a court’s decisions are explained by
somewhat consistent reasons that are absent from its justifications, the existence
of those explanatory reasons is likely to lead to the exercise of judicial power
for reasons that will not be apparent merely from reading the justifications
provided in past decisions. Those sorts of reasons, and not whether a decision
was inspired by a sunset, are what advocates of judicial candor have in mind.
The second critique of the decision-justification distinction is that it fails to
account for the nuances of judicial decisionmaking and thus to provide an
accurate description of the judicial process. Although neither speaks directly to
the point, both Golding and Wasserstrom implicitly view the decision of which
party should win in a given suit, rather than the rationale, as the decision subject
to justification.87 That, however, seems to be an inappropriately narrow concep-
tion of what judges decide. Indeed, the identity of the winner of a given case
will typically matter only to the parties to that case. The same holds even if we
conceive of specific legal or factual disputes as the relevant unit of decision. For
everyone else to whom the court’s decision will be significant, including those
who must order their affairs in compliance with the law and judges who must
decide future cases in accordance with the law, it is the court’s rationale, and
perhaps even the precise language in which it articulates that rationale, that is
significant.88 Thus the content of the justification is an important part of a
court’s decision. To illustrate by way of a simple example, a decision that a
defendant is not liable because his conduct was not negligent is different from a
decision that he is not liable because the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
At the broad level on which Wasserstrom and Golding operate, the “decision” is
the same: defendant wins. And while the defendant in that case will care only
about the result in the sense that he is not liable, future defendants, and those
who wish to avoid becoming defendants, will care about why the defendant was
not liable. Significantly, they will only care about what the court provides in the
way of a rationale. For future defendants, in other words, the important compo-
nent of the court’s decision is not the identity of the winner, but rather the
87. See GOLDING, supra note 78, at 8–9 (equating the court’s “decision” with its “conclusion,” which
is to be justified to an audience consisting most prominently of the losing litigant); WASSERSTROM, supra
note 67, at 1–3 (referring to courts deciding “cases”).
88. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 683 (1986) (“[W]hen we are
in the pit of actual application, we will discover that it is not what the Supreme Court held that matters,
but what it said. In interpretive arenas below the Supreme Court, one good quote is worth a hundred
clever analyses of holding.”). Ninth Circuit Judges Kozinski and Reinhart have justified their support
for nonprecedential opinions by reference to the fact that the phrasing of their decisions has preceden-
tial consequence. See Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhart, Please Don’t Cite This! Why We Don’t Allow
Citation to Unpublished Decisions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 44 (noting that for an opinion to properly
be designated as precedential, the members of the court must agree not only on the result, but also on its
phrasing).
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rationale that the court offers in support.
What this suggests is that any attempt to separate decision and justification is
not merely artificial, but also inaccurate as even a simplified description of the
process. What seems more likely instead is a process in which the act of writing
feeds back to modify the justification (and hence the decision) as it is being
formulated.89 “Decision” is thus not a singular moment that precedes justifica-
tion and is either confirmed or rejected on the basis of the “testing” that occurs
via the process of justification. Decision is instead an ongoing process that
might begin with a flash of insight, and that might be influenced by additional
flashes of insight during its course, but that begins with a broad-level decision
(defendant wins) and then proceeds through a process of narrowing (defendant
wins because plaintiff was contributorily negligent) and refinement (defendant
wins because plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that finding is appropri-
ate because of X, Y, and Z). And even this description is undoubtedly too linear
and simplistic to capture the complexity of the relationship. In some instances
the transformation will be so substantial as to result in a different decision even
at the Wasserstrom and Golding level of which party wins, but more often the
process will result in modifications of rationale and phrasing that affect the
reach of the court’s decision in future cases. The important point is that the
decision is not complete until the justification is complete.
This will not always be true. There are, after all, such things as “easy cases,”
as to which settled law provides a clear answer. In those situations the deductive
process depicted in the typical opinion is likely to be an accurate description of
how the court actually decided the case. For example, if the law is clear that
contributory negligence does not bar a plaintiff from recovering, but the trial
court nonetheless gave a contributory-negligence instruction to the jury, then the
appellate judges reviewing the case are more likely to have drawn on their
knowledge of the law relating to contributory negligence in deciding the case
than they are to have relied on any hunch or flash of insight. In such a situation
the value to future actors is not likely to be substantial, since the opinion’s
contribution to the body of law would only be to provide a small additional
increment of assurance that contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery.
Ultimately, it seems most appropriate to conclude that any distinction be-
tween decision and justification that regards them as wholly separate processes
is, at best, partially correct. That is to say, there is undoubtedly some perhaps
large set of cases in which the law is not indeterminate, in which the nature of
the appropriate decision follows naturally from the settled law, and in which a
court’s decision can accurately be characterized as having been made prior to
and apart from the process of justification. These conditions do not hold for all
cases, of course. And for those cases in which they do not, there is reason to
suspect that the process of justification will lead to changes in the content of the
89. The suggestion is consistent with Dan Simon’s bi-directional account of the judicial reasoning
process. See Simon, supra note 67, at 122–23.
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justification. In the American legal system, of course, the process of justification
typically involves the creation of a written opinion setting forth the court’s
reasoning. The remainder of this Article considers how that process might affect
the decisionmaking that it purports merely to reflect.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WRITING AND COGNITION
Judges writing about the opinion-writing process commonly observe that the
process of writing an opinion serves as a valuable check on the decisionmaking
process. The phenomenon is most often captured in the phrase “it won’t
write.”90 The core idea is that judges at least occasionally find that a result or
line of reasoning that seemed appropriate at one point in the decisionmaking
process no longer seems so attractive when the judge attempts to transfer it to
paper. Perhaps the authorities the judge thought justify one result turn out
instead to justify another. Or perhaps writing reveals gaps in what appeared to
be an unbroken chain of logic. Whatever the mechanism by which the act of
writing disciplines the process of decision, the key point is that judges seem to
agree that the process of creating a written justification for a decision will often
alter the terms of the justification, and thus in an important sense alter the
decision itself.
The basic notion that writing serves to refine thought has likewise had a
consistent presence in the academic literature on the writing process.91 Only
recently, however, have cognitive scientists begun to study the relationship in
more depth. Although the research remains in its early stages, it has already
revealed that writing’s benefits are not universal. That is, while many types of
decisionmaking benefit from being made pursuant to a process that incorporates
a written component—including perhaps most of the sorts of decisions that
judges are called upon to make—not all do. This Part outlines the research on
the psychology of writing, as well as related research that might shed light on
the relationship between writing and judging.
A. TEXT VERSUS ORALITY
If it is an overstatement to say that the use of text is necessary to a legal
system, it is only slightly so. Writing freezes verbalization, ensuring continuity
of content and facilitating publicity.92 The commitment of a rule to writing thus
allows for broader and more consistent dissemination of the rule. It is no
coincidence that every modern legal system utilizes written codes and records
90. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., JUDITH A. LANGER & ARTHUR N. APPLEBEE, HOW WRITING SHAPES THINKING: A STUDY OF
TEACHING AND LEARNING 3–5 (1987); FRANK SMITH, WRITING AND THE WRITER 1 (2d ed. 1994) (“Not only
can a piece of writing communicate thought from writer to reader . . . but also the act of writing can tell
the author things that were not known (or not known to be known) before the writing began.”).
92. See Paul Bergman, The War Between the States (of Mind): Oral Versus Textual Reasoning, 40
ARK. L. REV. 505, 525 (1987).
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of court decisions, and that preliterate societies typically lack what we would
characterize as a system of law.93
The use of text provides another advantage. Words captured in writing can be
more easily manipulated in thought. While speech exists for only an instant,94
text remains to be reviewed and reconsidered. Because the reader need not
devote great effort to storing the content of text in his memory, he can expend
more energy on understanding and assessing the material.95 This enables more
complex processing. Indeed, written text may be essential to the widespread use
of syllogistic reasoning,96 which figures prominently in legal discourse.97 In
sum, as Ronald Collins and David Skover put it, “[t]he typographic word
enhances all of the values associated with the supremacy of law—uniformity,
predictability, universality, and analytical applicability of printed commands.
With its systematic categories and abstract concepts, typographic law empha-
sizes detached and logical analysis.”98
Text, then, seems necessary to law, and is an important component of the type
of methodical, logical reasoning that is the hallmark of legal systems.99 To say
this, however, is not necessarily to say that the act of writing is equally
important. Text need not be the product of writing. Legal texts could be
generated through the transcription of speech. The means of creation do not
affect the central virtues that the use of text brings to a legal system. Whether
the process of writing might add value in its own right is a separate question.
93. See JACK GOODY, THE DOMESTICATION OF THE SAVAGE MIND 11 (1977); WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY
AND LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD 33–34 (1982) (discussing the difficulties faced by a
primarily oral culture in seeking to work through a complex problem); see also Ehrenberg, supra note
7, at 1186 (noting the centrality of writing to a sophisticated legal system).
94. Cf. ONG, supra note 93, at 31–32 (“[S]ound has a special relationship to time unlike that of the
other fields that register in human sensation. Sound exists only when it is going out of existence. It is
not simply perishable but essentially evanescent, and it is sensed as evanescent.”).
95. See id. at 39 (discussing the way in which “[w]riting establishes in the text a ‘line’ of continuity
outside the mind” which allows the reader to concentrate on assessment).
96. Syllogisms can be viewed as “an act of graphic representation, in the sense that laying out an
argument in this way is hardly a characteristic feature of oral discourse but . . . is one whose formal
presentation depends upon the written word.” JACK GOODY, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE WRITTEN AND
THE ORAL 279 (1987).
97. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42 (1990) (noting that “most legal
questions are resolved syllogistically”) (emphasis omitted).
98. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 534 (1992).
99. See Schwartzman, supra note 86, at 4. Schwartzman states:
Judges are charged with the responsibility of adjudicating legal disagreements between
citizens. As such, their decisions are backed with the collective and coercive force of political
society, the exercise of which requires justification. It must be defended in a way that those
who are subject to it can, at least in principle, understand and accept. To determine whether a
given justification satisfies this requirement, judges must make public the reasons for their
decisions. Those who fail to give sincere legal justifications violate this condition of legiti-
macy. They act against the demands of the adjudicative role assigned to them.
Id.
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B. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WRITING AND THOUGHT
Although the idea that writing is merely transcription of thought has a
superficial appeal, psychologists and linguists agree that it is inaccurate. As
Steven Pinker observes, we commonly have the experience of making a state-
ment, either orally or in writing, and immediately recognizing that “it wasn’t
exactly what we meant to say.”100 It follows, he argues, that “there has to be a
‘what we meant to say’ that is different from what we said.”101 What is more,
“[w]hen we hear or read, we usually remember the gist, not the exact words, so
there has to be such a thing as a gist that it not the same as a bunch of
words.”102 The language of thought is distinct from language as we typically
conceive of it, and while it is in many respects less complex than the language
of words,103 it is also capable of carrying a great deal more information at any
given moment.104
This latter observation holds on two levels. First is the level of conscious
thought. I am aware, as I write this, of considerably more information about
what I want to say than I can possibly put into words (either orally or in writing)
with anything approaching simultaneity. I have a plan not only for what the next
paragraphs will say, but also for how what I am about to say ties in with the rest
of the observations and arguments that, as I write this, I also have mostly yet to
make. The task of writing this Article would be considerably easier were I able
to translate all that information into text as quickly as I can think it. By the time
this is published, however, I will have spent an inordinate amount of time
organizing, reorganizing, and otherwise manipulating the raw information pres-
ently contained in my thoughts. The second level at which thought can carry
more information than language is that of unconscious thought. Humans are
able to process considerably more information than we are consciously aware of
processing.105 Our minds grapple with information even when our attention is
directed elsewhere.
100. STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 57 (1994).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 58.
103. Id. at 82 (noting that, while thought is in many respects richer than language, “mentalese must
be simpler than spoken languages; conversation-specific words and constructions (like a and the) are
absent, and information about pronouncing words, or even ordering them, is unnecessary”).
104. Id. at 81. Pinker states:
The representations underlying thinking, on the one hand, and the sentences in a language, on
the other, are in many ways at cross-purposes. Any particular thought in our head embraces a
vast amount of information. But when it comes to communicating a thought to someone else,
attention spans are short and mouths are slow. To get information into a listener’s head in a
reasonable amount of time, a speaker can encode only a fraction of the message into words
and must count on the listener to fill in the rest.
Id.
105. See infra section III.D.2.
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C. TRANSFORMING THOUGHT (INTO TEXT)
Because thought can carry more information than language, and because it
operates in a fundamentally different way, verbalization necessarily entails a
process of translation. The writer must take her thoughts, the meaning of which
are clear to her even though they may be somewhat unformed, and put them
into words. She must, in other words, move from an immediately accessible (to
her) private meaning to a public meaning that can be accessed solely through
the medium of words.106 However difficult this may be in the context of speech,
it requires vastly more effort to put thoughts into writing. An oralist can rely on
intonation, gesture, and other non-verbal cues to convey much of her intended
meaning.107 Her words can consequently be relatively imprecise, because the
audience will have the ability to interpret them in the context of her delivery.
With writing, in contrast, the words themselves must do all the work, and the
writer must take care to make appropriate selections.108 She cannot control the
context in which they will be read, nor can she provide cues to aid in the
interpretation of ambiguity. As Ronald Kellogg points out, “writing anything
but the most routine and brief pieces is the mental equivalent of digging
ditches.”109
This level of effort is necessary not merely because of the difficulty involved
in moving from the realm of thought to speech. Just as writing cannot convey
the contents of one’s thought, it also does not merely distill thought. Sophisti-
cated writers engage in a constant process of “metacognition”—monitoring and
evaluating both their thoughts and the felicity with which they have put those
thoughts into words.110 As a result, the process of writing involves the transfor-
mation of thought. Writers have long expressed the sentiment that only through
writing can one come to fully understand the subject matter about which one is
writing.111 Psychologists agree that the process of writing leads one to engage
with a subject, and to manipulate one’s thoughts regarding that subject, in a
106. RONALD T. KELLOGG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WRITING 10, 25 (1994). Kellogg explains, “Writers
must be able to represent their inner experiences, feelings, beliefs, and attitudes such that they can then
be shared and understood in a public forum. Forging the relationship between personal and consensual
symbols is difficult and may never be completely successful.” Id. at 10.
107. “Many a page of prose and many a narrative has been devoted to expressing what was, in
effect, a sob, a moan, a laugh, or a piercing scream. The written word spells out in sequence what is
quick and implicit in the spoken word.” MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS
OF MAN 79 (1964); see also David R. Olson, From Utterance to Text: The Bias of Language in Speech
and Writing, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 257, 263 (1977).
108. See, e.g., DAVID R. OLSON, THE WORLD ON PAPER: THE CONCEPTUAL AND COGNITIVE IMPLICATIONS
OF WRITING AND READING 91 (1994) (elaborating on the hypothesis “that whereas spoken utterances tend
to indicate both what is said and how it is to be taken, written ones tend to specify only the former”).
109. KELLOGG, supra note 106, at 17.
110. Id.
111. Kellogg characterizes the self-reports of professional writers as revealing a process involving “a
struggle to generate and shape ideas, with the translation from the personal realm of thought to the
public realm of text spurring further invention and insight on the part of the writer.” Id. at 25.
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unique way.112 Kellogg uses the phrase “active construction,” meaning “a
struggle to generate and shape ideas, with the translation from the personal
realm of thought to the public realm of text spurring further invention and
insight on the part of the writer.”113 As a consequence, someone who has
written about a topic will almost inevitably emerge from the process with
different thoughts about the topic. The change may be significant, involving a
radically different assessment of the subject matter, or it may simply involve a
greater appreciation for nuance. In either case, the writer’s knowledge has been
transformed by the process.
Psychologists Carl Bereiter and Marlene Scardamalia suggest that the process
of writing can occur under one of two fundamental models.114 The first is the
“knowledge telling” model. Under this model, writing resembles ordinary
conversational speech in that the writer simply translates whatever knowledge
he already has into textual form.115 Although the process entails some knowl-
edge transformation, the writer’s primary goal is to convey existing, intact
blocks of information from his memory to his audience.116 This is the model
followed by young and otherwise unsophisticated writers, who focus most of
their effort on retrieving information from memory, making a basic assessment
of its appropriateness to the topic, and generating sentences.117 Writers engaged
in knowledge telling tend not to focus on organization or to seek to achieve
specific rhetorical goals and do not devote a great deal of effort to editing.118
Bereiter and Scardamalia’s second model is the “knowledge transforming”
approach.119 As its name suggests, the hallmark of this method is that it
“enable[s] the individual to accomplish alone what is normally accomplished
only through social interaction—namely, the reprocessing of knowledge.”120
This, they posit, is a fundamentally different process. Writers engaged in
knowledge transformation are not simply doing a better job at the same task as
compared to those engaged in knowledge telling. “What distinguishes the more
studied abilities [of knowledge transformers] is that they involve deliberate,
strategic control over parts of the process that are unattended to in the more
naturally developed ability [relied on by knowledge tellers].”121 For these
writers, the act of writing involves the reworking of thought. Such writers
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id. at 25.
114. CARL BEREITER & MARLENE SCARDAMALIA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WRITTEN COMPOSITION 5–6
(1987). Although their discussion proceeds as if one were either one sort of writer or the other, they
acknowledge that in reality the processes on which they focus may be points on a continuum. See id. at
29.
115. See id. at 9–10.
116. Id. at 22, 29.
117. See KELLOGG, supra note 106, at 88.
118. See id.
119. BEREITER & SCARDAMALIA, supra note 114, at 5–6.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 6.
2008] 1307WRITING, COGNITION, AND THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
engage in simultaneous acts of problem-solving. In what Bereiter and Scardama-
lia call the “content space,” writers address problems relating to their beliefs
and knowledge concerning the topic about which they are writing.122 Here “one
works out opinions, makes moral decisions, generates inferences about matters
of fact, formulates causal explanations, and so on.”123 In the “rhetorical space,”
writers grapple with the need to achieve certain rhetorical goals.124 Here the
focus is on word choice, organization, and the like. These processes interact as
writers consider “whether the text they have written says what they want it to
say and whether they themselves believe what the text says.”125 Bereiter and
Scardamalia contend “that this interaction between the two problem spaces
constitutes the essence of reflection in writing.”126
For instance, recognition that a key term will not be understood by many
readers gets translated into a call for definition; search within the content
space for semantic specifications leads to a realization by the writer that he or
she doesn’t actually have a clear concept associated with the term, and this
realization sets off a major reanalysis of the point being made.127
As Bereiter and Scardamalia acknowledge, these models are not descriptively
accurate in the sense that people are either one sort of writer or another, or that
they engage in only one type of writing during the course of any given writing
project.128 Writers’ behavior in reality more likely falls along a continuum on
which their two models represent core concepts.129 Other variables also come
into play. For example, those with greater subject-matter expertise approach the
task of writing relating to the content of their expertise in ways that are
qualitatively different from novices.130 Experts are more sensitive to the rhetori-
cal goals of their task, while novices remain relatively more focused on content,
and experts are likely to go about the planning process differently.131 This
difference is starkly illustrated by the distinction between knowledge telling and
knowledge transformation, but it also appears to be the case that those with
greater subject-matter expertise will generally have to invest less effort to
produce an equivalent product.132 This is not to suggest that subject-matter
expertise makes writing easy, only that it introduces efficiencies that may in turn
be offset by additional aspects of the tasks attended to by experts (but to a lesser
122. Id. at 302; see also KELLOGG, supra note 106, at 34.
123. BEREITER & SCARDAMALIA, supra note 114, at 302.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 11.
126. Id. at 302.
127. Id. at 303.
128. Id. at 29.
129. See id.
130. See KELLOGG, supra note 106, at 72–74.
131. Id. at 86–87.
132. Id. at 88, 89, 91–93.
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degree, if at all, by novices).133
D. WRITING AND DECISIONMAKING
Most commentary on the relationship between writing and thought, whether
relating to judging or otherwise, proceeds no farther than the observation that
the former affects the latter. The unstated assumption is that the transformation
in thought engendered by writing is uniformly desirable. But that might not be
so. To say that writing transforms the writer’s thinking is only to say so much.
Any such transformation with respect to the writer’s understanding of her
subject matter need not be either consequential or positive. Perhaps the effect of
writing is simply to reinforce the preconceptions one brought to the task, such
that, having written, the writer holds her views more strongly but with no
deeper level of understanding and without regard to their validity. Or perhaps
writing does change the writer’s assessment of a topic, but not for the better.
Someone who has started writing might, for example, become so influenced by
the conceptual path she has started down that she fails to appreciate other
aspects of her subject that might have occurred to her had she not become
captured by the words she has put on paper.
Still another potential dynamic comes into play when the writing is intended
not merely to describe, but also to serve as part of a decisionmaking process.
Even if writing does lead at least occasionally to changed decisions, it may not
be the case that those decisions are necessarily better than the decisions that
would have resulted in the absence of writing. Writing might simply serve as an
echo chamber, pursuant to which one’s confidence in a decision is increased
even if the decision itself is not improved. Alternatively, writing may alter
thought processes in such a way as to negatively affect the decisional calculus.
A decision that may seem more logical and considered may in fact be subopti-
mal.
Although the research remains in its early stages, studies suggest that the
relationship between writing and cognition is less straightforward than tradi-
tional accounts have assumed. Consistent with the standard account, research
has suggested a positive link between writing and subject-matter comprehen-
sion.134 The relationship between writing and effective decisionmaking, in
contrast, appears to be more complex. Due partly to the fact that it is difficult to
assess decisional quality, this research remains in its early stages.135 That said, a
small body of studies suggests that writing is beneficial to some kinds of
decisionmaking, but detrimental to others.
133. See id. at 204 (“Even when a writer satisfices on performance in an attempt to lessen the
investment of cognitive effort in a writing task, the degree of automatization obtained is only relative.
In sharp contrast to what is seen in the development of other skills, as writers mature and gain
expertise, they invest more effort and reflective thought in the task.”).
134. See Winston Sieck & J. Frank Yates, Exposition Effects on Decision Making: Choice and
Confidence in Choice, 70 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207, 207 (1997).
135. See id.
2008] 1309WRITING, COGNITION, AND THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
1. Verbalization and Thought
Because the transformation from thought to text involves an intermediate step
from the language of thought to the language of communication, we begin our
review by considering the research relating to the relationship between thought
and verbalization generally. Indeed, most of the research exploring the relation-
ship between justifying one’s reasoning and problem-solving effectiveness has
involved oral rather than written justification. Much of that research is consis-
tent with the traditional understanding that the process of verbally justifying
one’s choices leads to better choices, at least insofar as the situation is one in
which the best choice equates to the most logical choice. For example, subjects
asked to verbalize aloud when solving the “Tower of Hanoi” problem,136 which
requires thinking to proceed in a series of incremental, logical steps, performed
better than those who were not.137
But verbalization does not always improve performance. In a series of
experiments, psychologist Jonathan Schooler has explored what he calls the
“verbal overshadowing effect.”138 This effect comes into play when one con-
fronts situations involving aspects that are difficult to verbalize. One example is
the recognition of faces.139 Subjects asked to provide verbal explanations while
engaged in a facial recognition task tend to focus on aspects such as the facial
features that can easily be verbalized to the relative exclusion of the less-readily
articulable aspects of the process of facial recognition (such as how those
features relate to one another).140 As a result, those who are asked to verbalize
during the process perform more poorly than those who are not.141 In similar
fashion, verbalization can negatively affect performance in the context of
“insight problems,” problems that do not require rigorous, sustained thought to
be solved, but rather involve the recognition of a single aspect of the problem,
136. The Tower of Hanoi problem requires subjects, in as few moves as possible, to transfer discs of
varying diameter (or, alternately, labeled with sequential numbers) from one peg to another, subject to
two rules: subjects can only move one disc at a time and discs of larger diameter (or with a higher
number) cannot be placed on discs with smaller diameter (or a lower number). See, e.g., Leif Stinessen,
The Influence of Verbalization on Problem-Solving, 26 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCH. 342, 343–44 (1985).
137. See Mary E. Ahlum-Heath & Francis J. Di Vesta, The Effect of Conscious Controlled Verbaliza-
tion of a Cognitive Strategy on Transfer in Problem Solving, 14 MEMORY & COGNITION 281 (1986);
Stinessen, supra note 136.
138. E.g., Joseph M. Melcher & Jonathan W. Schooler, Perceptual and Conceptual Training
Mediate the Verbal Overshadowing Effect in an Unfamiliar Domain, 32 MEMORY & COGNITION 618,
618–19 (2004) (providing an overview of the “verbal overshadowing effect”).
139. Sean M. Lane & Jonathan W. Schooler, Skimming the Surface: Verbal Overshadowing of
Analogical Retrieval, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 715, 715 (2004). For a brief overview of the research relating to
the verbal overshadowing effect in the context of facial recognition, see Christian A. Meissner & Amina
Memon, Verbal Overshadowing: A Special Issue Exploring Theoretical and Applied Issues, 16 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 869, 869–71 (2002).
140. See Lane & Schooler, supra note 139, at 715.
141. See generally Jonathan W. Schooler & Tonya Y. Engstler-Schooler, Verbal Overshadowing of
Visual Memories: Some Things Are Better Left Unsaid, 22 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 36 (1990).
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often after coming to an impasse, that makes solution easy.142 For example: “A
prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found in his cell a rope that
was half long enough to permit him to reach the ground safely. He divided the
rope in half, tied the two parts together, and escaped. How could he have done
this?”143 The answer involves the realization that a rope consists of multiple
strands that could be unraveled and then tied together to double its length.144
Subjects who were asked to describe their process of attempting to solve the
problems solved significantly fewer problems than those who were not.145
Notably, the performance of subjects participating in the same study who were
asked to solve logic problems was not affected by verbalization.146
Verbalization can likewise negatively affect the ability to assess analogies.
Sean Lane and Jonathan Schooler conducted two experiments in which subjects
were asked to determine whether stories were analogous to one another.147 Half
were asked to think out loud while making their determination, while half were
not. In both experiments, verbalization made it less likely that subjects would
uncover deep structural analogies between stories, instead focusing on surface
similarities.148 Lane and Schooler posited that this resulted from the accessibil-
ity and articulability of surface-level features of the stories as opposed to deeper
structural features and concluded that the finding “fits with research demonstrat-
ing that verbalization biases subjects toward verbalizable processes.”149 Schooler
and his colleagues have likewise shown that verbal overshadowing affects
performance on tasks like assessing the quality of various strawberry jams150
142. See Jonathan W. Schooler et al., Thoughts Beyond Words: When Language Overshadows
Insight, 122 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSCYHOL.: GEN. 166, 166, 177 (1993).
143. Id. at 182.
144. Id. Another example: “A dealer in antique coins got an offer to buy a beautiful bronze coin. The
coin had an emperor’s head on one side and the date 544 B.C. stamped on the other. The dealer
examined the coin, but instead of buying it, he called the police. Why?” Id. Here the answer requires
recognition of the fact that nobody in the year we now refer to as 544 B.C. (“before Christ”) would have
referred to it in that way, or even could have known to do so. Id. at 183.
145. Id. at 170–77. The effect appeared under two different experimental designs. In the first,
“subjects were interrupted after 2 min of working on each problem. The interruption lasted 1.5 min.
During that time, those in the verbalization condition were instructed to write out all relevant thoughts
that had occurred during the first 2 min of solving the problem.” Id. at 170; see also id. at 172 (noting
the use of the same basic procedure in a second experiment). In the second, subjects were asked “to
think aloud while solving each problem.” Id. at 174; see also id. at 176 (noting the use of the same
basic procedure in an additional experiment).
146. Id. at 177, 183.
147. Lane & Schooler, supra note 139.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 718.
150. Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the
Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1991). The experiments
in this study involved having subjects rate strawberry jams in one experiment and college course
alternatives in the other. Some subjects were asked to reflect on their ratings while others were not.
These groups’ ratings were then compared against expert assessments of the same items. These
comparisons revealed that introspection led to choices that were less consistent with expert assessment,
and thus to “worse” choices. Id.
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and making college course selections.151
2. The Unconscious Thought Theory
Schooler has described the verbal overshadowing effect as involving a phenom-
enon in which “verbalization may cause such a ruckus in the ‘front’ of one’s
mind that one is unable to attend to the new approaches that may be emerging in
the ‘back’ of one’s mind.”152 Psychologist Ap Dijksterhuis and his colleagues
have explored a similar insight in developing and testing what they refer to as
the “Unconscious Thought Theory.”153 According to this theory, people have
the ability to process a vast amount of information without consciously devot-
ing effort to the task.154 The distinction between conscious and unconscious
thought turns on attention: “Conscious thought is thought with attention; uncon-
scious thought is thought without attention (or with attention directed else-
where).”155
A key difference between the two types of thought lies in their relative
capacities. Conscious thought has limited capacity. It can generally do only one
thing at a time and has only enough capacity to store roughly seven items.156 As
a result, “conscious thought by necessity often takes into account only a subset
of the information it should take into account.”157 In addition, conscious
thought, like verbalization, tends to focus attention on the more salient aspects
of a problem, and thereby to lead to inappropriate weighing of the relevant
attributes.158 This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that conscious thought
provides the best means for decision only in certain circumstances. The key is
not to strain its capacity. Thus, conscious thought works well for relatively
simple decisions involving few variables.159 Conscious thought is also best
151. Id. Rosalind Tordesillas and Shelly Chaiken replicated this second portion of Wilson &
Schooler’s experiment with some modifications. Rosalind S. Tordesillas & Shelly Chaiken, Thinking
Too Much or Too Little? The Effects of Introspection on the Decision-Making Process, 25 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 625 (1999). They concluded that introspection is harmful to decisionmaking
when it diverts attention away from the information most relevant to the analysis. Id. at 630.
152. Schooler et al., supra note 142, at 169.
153. Ap Dijksterhuis & Loran F. Nordgren, A Theory of Unconscious Thought, 1 PERSP. PSCYHOL.
SCI. 95 (2006).
154. Id. at 96. Others also have studied the power of unconscious processing. See, e.g., GUY
CLAXTON, HARE BRAIN, TORTOISE MIND: WHY INTELLIGENCE INCREASES WHEN YOU THINK LESS (1997);
TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002). Many
of these ideas were popularized in MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT
THINKING (2005).
155. Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, supra note 153, at 96. Put more formally, “[w]e define conscious
thought as object-relevant or task-relevant . . . thought processes that occur while the object or task is
the focus of one’s conscious attention . . . . Unconscious thought refers to object-relevant or task-
relevant cognitive or affective thought processes that occur while conscious attention is directed
elsewhere.” Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 96.
158. See Ap Dijksterhuis et al., On Making the Right Choice: The Deliberation-Without-Attention
Effect, 311 SCIENCE 1005, 1005 (2006)
159. See Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, supra note 153, at 103.
1312 [Vol. 96:1283THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
when rule-following is appropriate. “During conscious thought, one can deal
with logical problems that require being precise and following rules strictly,
whereas during unconscious thought one cannot.”160 But because of its limited
capacity, conscious thought fares less well as tasks become more complex.
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren use the example of the effort to select from among a
number of houses that are comparable on a general level but dissimilar in their
particulars.161 Just as with verbal overshadowing, people fail to take all relevant
considerations into account, focusing instead “on attributes that are accessible,
plausible, and easy to verbalize.”162 They employ mental shortcuts—people tend to
resort to stereotypes more when engaged in conscious thought, and when faced with a
task that requires the consideration and processing of large amounts of information
(such as when serving as a juror) tend to quickly form a sense as to the appropriate
result and then interpret subsequent information in light of that expectancy.163
Unconscious thought, in contrast, has a vastly greater capacity. Dijksterhuis
and Nordgren estimate that conscious thought can process from ten to sixty bits
of information per second.164 “The entire human system combined, however,
can process about 11,200,000 bits per second.”165 Dijksterhuis and his col-
leagues formulated the “deliberation-without-attention” hypothesis to character-
ize our ability to put this vast processing power to work to make “back of the
mind” assessments.166 While unconscious thought is incapable of the analytic
precision of conscious thought, its greater capacity makes it less susceptible to
deterioration in decision quality as complexity increases.167 As a result, they
contend that unconscious deliberation will lead to better choices both where a
large amount of information must be taken into account and in the context of
decisions that call for weighing the relative importance of significant factors.168
What is more, in these sorts of situations unconscious processing appears to result in
more consistent decisions over time as compared to those reached consciously.169
This process, it bears noting, is not instantaneous. Unconscious processing of complex
decisions involves the relatively slow integration of the large amounts of information
“into relatively sound summary judgments, giving the pieces of information (more or
less) appropriate weights depending on their relative importance. In principle, this
means that the quality of decisions made after unconscious thought is independent
from the complexity of the problems.”170
160. Id. at 101.
161. Id. at 95–96.
162. Id. at 100.
163. Id. at 98.
164. Id. at 96–97.
165. Id. at 97.
166. See Dijksterhuis et al., supra note 158.
167. Id. at 1006.
168. Id.; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, supra note 153, at 100.
169. See Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, supra note 153, at 100–01 (citing Loran F. Nordgren & Ap
Dijksterhuis, Conscious Thought and Decisional Noise (2006) (unpublished manuscript)).
170. Id. at 103.
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There are qualifications. First, subject-matter expertise may ameliorate some
of the shortcomings of conscious thought. In other words, those who are
knowledgeable about the subject of their conscious reflection tend not to be led
as far astray by the process of reflection as those who are not.171 Second,
unconscious processing is only effective if the information on which it is based
is effectively acquired in the first instance.172 Dijksterhuis and Nordgren call
this “the ‘best of both worlds’ hypothesis: Complex decisions are best when the
information is encoded thoroughly and consciously, and the later thought
process is delegated to the unconscious.”173 Finally, the Unconscious Thought
Theory remains in the early stages of development. At present, the theory
implies that unconscious thought is preferable where the goal is the general goal
of making a “good” decision.174 Thus one who is attempting to choose the most
suitable house for oneself would do well to follow its dictates. It is not,
however, clear that this conclusion holds when the goal is more specific, such as
to assess whether a certain house is best not for oneself, but for someone
else.175
In this case, attributes different from the ones you are used to, such as the
absence of stairs, become important. It is not clear whether unconscious
thought is good at making such decisions. Relatively specific goals often
imply strict rules, and as we have argued, conscious thought is better at
following rules.176
3. The Effect of Writing
Based on the research outlined in the preceding two subparts, it seems
difficult to predict the effect that writing might have on decisional processes.
One could imagine that writing could offset some of the negative effects
encountered with oral verbalization. Decisional processes required to assess
the extent to which two situations are analogous, for example, might benefit
from the knowledge-transformative effects of writing and thereby uncover the
deep analogies obscured by oral verbalization.177 This might occur because
writing facilitates the use of logic in conscious thought, because the greater
time commitment required by writing allows for more unconscious processing
to occur, or because of some combination of the two. On the other hand, it
might be that writing introduces its own negative effects. Once writing is
underway, the writer may become committed to the course of reasoning she has
171. See id. at 106 n.4; see also Timothy D. Wilson et al., The Disruptive Effects of Explaining
Attitudes: The Moderating Effect of Knowledge About the Attitude Object, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 379 (1989).
172. Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, supra note 153, at 106.
173. Id. at 107.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 147–151.
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started to articulate and thereby become to some extent blinded to alternative
approaches.
Relatively little work has explored the relationship between writing and
decisionmaking or problem solving. The studies that exist, however, suggest
that, like oral verbalization, writing can sometimes help and sometimes hinder
performance. In one study, Winston Sieck and Frank Yates explored the impact
of written exposition on subjects’ susceptibility to “framing effects.”178 Framing
effects result from people’s tendency to accept information in the form in which
it is provided, which in turn leads them to analyze the same situation differently
depending on the given reference points, or “frames.”179 Thus, for example,
consumers will tend to purchase additional insurance coverage when doing so is
part of a default package that provides the ability to opt out of the additional
coverage for a discount, but will not purchase it where the coverage is not
included in the default package but may be added for an additional fee.180 This
is so even where the economics of the two alternatives are identical. Sieck and
Yates found, in each of the three experiments they conducted, that subjects who
engaged in written exposition of their thought processes were less influenced by
framing effects.181 They explained this finding “by suggesting that writing
encourages people to actively manipulate the information presented to them in
the problem description,”182 which in turn increases the salience of aspects of
the problem that were previously obscured by the frame. With more of the
relevant information under active consideration, better decisions are likely to
result.183
But just as verbal overshadowing can lead people to overemphasize the more
readily verbalizable aspects of a problem in the context of oral explanation,
Sieck and his colleagues posited that a similar effect might hold in the context
of written justification.184 In a pair of studies, they examined the effect of
written justification on subjects’ judgment regarding the extent to which stories
were analogous. They hypothesized that justification would decrease the ability
178. Winston Sieck & J. Frank Yates, Exposition Effects on Decision Making: Choice and Confi-
dence in Choice, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207 (1997).
179. See, e.g., B.A. Mellers et al., Judgment and Decision Making, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 447,
455–56 (1998). Framing effects and related cognitive shortcuts have been the subject of a considerable
amount of legal scholarship in recent years. For a small sampling, see Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2003); Christine Jolls &
Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 205–06, 210–11 (2006); Nancy
Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics Problem in Feminist Legal Theory, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 417–22 (2006); Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2006).
180. Mellers et al., supra note 179, at 456 (discussing Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability
Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993)).
181. Sieck & Yates, supra note 178, at 216.
182. Id. at 210.
183. See Winston R. Sieck et al., Justification Effects on the Judgment of Analogy, 27 MEMORY &
COGNITION 844, 844 (1999).
184. See id.
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to distinguish between good and bad analogies by leading subjects to focus on
more readily articulable, but less appropriate, similarities.185 Their results were
consistent with this hypothesis.186 The experimenters found that subjects asked
to provide justifications for their selections focused more on surface-level rather
than deep-structural commonalities between situations.187 This, they concluded,
likely resulted from the easier-to-verbalize nature of the surface-level similari-
ties.188 While written justification led subjects to actively manipulate the informa-
tion presented to them, that manipulation focused their attention on its
verbalizable aspects.189 “The verbalized elements become more active in memory
via rehearsal and, hence, are more influential on subsequent actions.”190
As with oral verbalization, then, written justification appears beneficial to
certain types of decisionmaking and at least potentially stands as a hindrance to
others. The key consideration concerns the extent to which the important
aspects of the situation are verbalizable. When they are, written justification
should lead to better decisions. When they are not, in contrast, written justifica-
tion may lead decisionmakers astray. It is important not to overstate this point.
For one thing, the body of research underlying it is exceptionally thin. Although
it is consistent with the larger body of research exploring verbal overshadowing,
the differences between written and oral verbalization counsel against the belief
that the effect operates in the same way in both contexts. To suggest that those
who provide a written justification for a decision may be subject to verbal
overshadowing is not to suggest that written justification is as susceptible to the
phenomenon as oral justification. Writing involves the generation of text, which
enables the writer to subject her own thought to the greater scrutiny afforded by
text.191 The writer may be able to recognize and therefore remedy the incomplete-
ness of her justification in a way that the oralist cannot.192 In addition, the
process of providing a written justification takes longer than that of providing
an oral justification, thereby allowing more time for both conscious and uncon-
scious processing. As a result, there is good reason to imagine that writing
might be less susceptible to verbal overshadowing.
The expected format of the justification might also matter. A justification
focused on demonstrating that the decisionmaker took account of the appropri-
ate decisional inputs, rather than attempting to articulate too finely how she
balanced those inputs, would seem less likely to sway the underlying decision.
Such a justification would consist primarily of knowledge telling rather than
185. See id. at 847, 851.
186. See id. at 850, 852.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 853.
189. See id. at 844–45, 853.
190. Id. at 845; see also id. at 853.
191. See supra section I.A.
192. Cf. Ehrenberg, supra note 7, at 1189–90 (arguing that “[t]he classic speech-centered legal
process . . . does not truly offer the same opportunities for self-reflection and critique offered by the
writing-centered legal process”).
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knowledge transformation, thereby lessening the likelihood that the process of
writing would affect the substance of the decision. Alternatively, a decision-
maker could be required to speak to certain factors deemed crucial to the
analysis, or otherwise encouraged to write in such a way as to uncover more
than the immediately articulable justifications for decisions. Indeed, Sieck and
his colleagues suggest that increased precision of the written justification might
ameliorate the overshadowing effect.193
IV. WRITING AND THE FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
Prior scholarship has identified three primary functions served by judicial
opinions.194 The first is to discipline judges in the decisionmaking process. The
key idea here is that the act of writing helps to ensure that judges properly
reason through the issues put before them. The second is to facilitate the system
of precedent. Opinions memorialize judicial decisions so they can function as
authoritative statements of law governing the resolution of future cases. The
third is to legitimate those decisions. Roughly stated, opinions provide the
parties and the public with assurance that a given decision is not arbitrary, but
rather is the product of the reasoned application of appropriate legal standards.
As we will see, these functions overlap to a considerable extent.
Although these functions are identified with relative consistency in the
literature on judicial opinions, prior work has largely failed to develop either
their scope or implications or to consider the ways in which they might stand in
tension with one another. To an even greater degree, prior work lacks systematic
consideration of how these functions might play out at the different levels of the
judicial hierarchy. This is not to suggest that prior commentators do not
recognize that Supreme Court opinions serve different purposes (or, at least,
serve similar purposes in different ways) than trial court opinions.195 As is the
case with the functions of opinions more generally, however, identification of
the phenomenon has not led to development of its implications or to consider-
ation of the different applicability of these functions at different levels, and how
that might in turn have implications for when and how opinions are and ought
to be generated at the varying levels of the judicial hierarchy.
The goal of this section is to build on the previous literature by more
comprehensively exploring and refining the functions of written judicial opin-
193. See Sieck et al., supra note 183, at 853.
194. See, e.g., ALDISERT, PROCESS, supra note 66, at 604–10; APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 79–90
(Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974); THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 119–21 (1994). Although not expressly broken down into the same three
functions, Llewellyn’s analysis is similar. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 26–27 (1960). These are by no means the only conceivable reasons why judges write
opinions. For a relatively comprehensive list of potential reasons for a judicial opinion, see GEORGE,
supra note 22, at 387–90.
195. See, e.g., WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 55–74, 90–115 (1996) (devoting
separate chapters to “style and substance” in opinions from the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts).
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ions. In doing so, the analysis pays particular attention to the value that writing
plays in fulfilling these functions, relative to an alternative regime without
written opinions, such as one in which judicial decisions were justified orally. In
addition, it considers the ways in which the different functions of opinions play
out at the various levels of the judicial hierarchy. Although much of the
discussion is descriptive in nature, it is ultimately driven by the normative
questions of whether and when opinions are desirable. It consequently does not
consider, for example, many of the historical reasons for the precise manner in
which the American system developed.196
A. OPINIONS AS A MECHANISM FOR DISCIPLINING THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
Most judges, like most others to have opined on the subject, buy into the
notion that writing provides an important discipline on thought. In the judicial
context, the idea is encapsulated in the suggestion that sometimes an opinion
“won’t write.”197 On occasion, a result that seemed appropriate and justified
when merely thought about cannot survive the journey to written form. Consis-
tent with this, commentators agree that opinions serve as an important con-
straint on judicial decisionmaking.198 As Thomas Baker puts it, “[a]
decisionmaker who must reason through to a conclusion in print has reasoned in
fact.”199
Our study of the relationship between writing and cognition suggests that this
understanding is largely appropriate. Legal decisionmaking, much like solving
the Tower of Hanoi, often requires thought to proceed in logical steps, such that
a decisionmaking process with a written component could be expected to
increase its effectiveness.200 But the preceding analyses suggest that there may
be situations in which this understanding does not hold. To the extent that
judges must make decisions of the sort susceptible to verbal overshadowing,
opinions might serve as a hindrance rather than an aid.
To briefly recap, we have seen that the distinction between decision and
justification is not so clear as prior work has suggested.201 There are undoubt-
edly some situations in which the act of justification follows in a straightfor-
196. For example, conducting legal business in writing, rather than orally, was undoubtedly more
convenient in the early history of the United States, where neither transportation nor communication
technology made such orality feasible given the large geographic area of the country. See Ehrenberg,
supra note 7, at 1179–80 (discussing a cluster of factors that likely caused the American system to
diverge from the English). It also seems likely that a court that decides cases via writing will be
positioned to handle a larger number of cases than one working in a purely oral process. Efficiency
considerations underlie those small modifications that have been made to the oral nature of the English
process. See id. at 1177.
197. See supra text accompanying note 2.
198. E.g., FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH
57–58 (1980) (noting that the process of writing acts as a constraint on judging).
199. BAKER, supra note 194, at 120.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 136–137.
201. See supra Part II.
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ward way from the making of a decision and neither alters the content of the
decision nor stands in itself as something that ought to be regarded as a
component of the decision. But for many (perhaps even most) judicial deci-
sions, the process of justification can move the judge away from his initial
understanding of the proper resolution. Sometimes this movement may result in
the sort of dramatic turnabout that affects the identity of the winner. More often,
it will affect the rationale or the terms of the justification, which will themselves
have independent significance in a precedential sense. In these situations it is
not appropriate to characterize decision and justification as separate processes.
The psychological research concerning the relationship between verbal justifica-
tion and decisionmaking effectiveness is consistent with these insights. Whether
conducted orally or in writing, the process of justification will at least some-
times affect the quality of decision. And contrary to common belief, the effect is
not always beneficial. This research suggests that, rather than a simple di-
chotomy between decision and justification, judicial decisions fall into three
categories. The next subpart explores them in turn.
1. Refining the Decision-Justification Distinction
a. Pure Decision. The first category includes those instances in which deci-
sion and justification can appropriately be regarded as separate processes. Call
them “pure decision.” These are the so-called “easy cases,” in which the law is
determinate and its application clear. In such a situation an experienced judge
can easily make her decision based simply on hearing the contentions of the
parties and considering them in light of the governing standard. Take for
example a criminal defendant who argues that his conviction should be over-
turned because the jury should not have believed the prosecution’s chief wit-
ness. If that is all there is to the argument, that is clearly a losing case. A judge
who writes an opinion justifying the decision will be engaged almost exclu-
sively in knowledge telling, such that the process of writing would have no
transformative effect on her thought.202 The law assigns the function of assess-
ing credibility to the jury, and the defendant here has alleged nothing to remove
this case from the scope of that rule. Defendant loses, and the reasons for that
result are the same regardless of whether a justification follows the decision.
Purely as a descriptive matter, then, the two processes of decision and justifica-
tion can be regarded as distinct for the simple reason that the act of justification
will not affect the substance of the decision.
b. Positive Justification. The second category of decisions includes those in
which, descriptively speaking, justification affects decision and in which, norma-
tively speaking, that is a desired relationship. I will refer to these as “positive
justification” cases. Here the process of writing the opinion involves knowledge
202. See supra text accompanying notes 114–118.
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transformation.203 The judge gains an enhanced appreciation of the law, of the
particular nature of the dispute, or of the relationship between the two. That, in
turn, leads to a result that is somehow “better” than would have been the case
without writing. Most, if not all, depictions of the relationship between writing
and judging, and indeed between writing and thought more generally, take
positive justification to be the natural result of the process.204
c. Negative Justification. The cases in our third category include those in
which, descriptively speaking, justification affects decision, but in which, norma-
tively speaking, the transformation adversely affects the quality of the underly-
ing decision. These I will call “negative justification” cases. The key characteristic
of a negative-justification situation is that attempts to articulate too finely the
reasons for one’s decision might lead to verbal overshadowing, in which the
judge justifies the underlying decision by reference to available, plausible-
sounding reasons. One result is a mismatch between the actual reasons for the
judge’s decision and the publicly provided reasons. Such a mismatch would be
troubling not only because it would obscure the true reasons for the decision at
hand, but also because the publicly provided reasons would be the only ones
available to future courts, resulting in the possibility of skewed doctrine. But
there is another, perhaps more significant, consequence. Because a focus on
those reasons will distract the judge from the factors on which she would
otherwise base her decision and that would form the basis of a more accurate
decision, the influence of the writing process will undermine decisional quality
in the case at hand.205 This could result directly in one party winning rather than
another, or, more subtly, to lead the judge to misbalance equitable and contex-
tual factors, thereby leading to suboptimal conclusions regarding the extent to
which certain evidence will be admitted, discovery allowed, and the like. At the
same time, the sway of our collective intuitions regarding writing’s positive
effects on thought will lead the judge to be more confident in the decision than
if she had not written.
2. Drawing the Line
The fact that the traditional understanding has been that writing is beneficial
to judging is hardly surprising. Law by its very nature seems to require resort to
concepts capable of being captured in words.206 As our uneasiness with Justice
Stewart’s “I know it when I see it”207 approach to obscenity suggests, articulabil-
203. See supra text accompanying notes 119–127.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 2–4, 197–199.
205. This phenomenon, coupled with the sense that expertise may ameliorate some of the effects of
verbal overshadowing, provides an alternative explanation for the fact that we do not require any sort of
written justification from juries, but do ask judges serving as factfinders to issue findings of fact. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (in actions tried without a jury, requiring judges to set forth findings of fact, either
orally in open court or in an opinion or memorandum filed by the court).
206. See supra section III.A.
207. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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ity seems to be a prerequisite to legality.208 Judges who report that a decision
“will not write” do so on the understanding that a decision that cannot be
justified in writing is not an appropriate decision. Notwithstanding Holmes’s
famous epigram,209 logic plays a central role in most legal decisionmaking. The
written word thus strikes us as integral to the process. The act of writing, it
seems to follow, should likewise be beneficial. It requires the translation of the
imprecise, raw material of thought into the concrete, communicable finished
product of text. The process of translation in turn leads the writer to reconsider
the content of her thought once she has put it on paper. Written ideas are more
susceptible to sustained scrutiny and therefore, presumably, to being further
refined and improved. Thus just as oral verbalization facilitates solving a
problem like the Tower of Hanoi, which requires a methodical, logical ap-
proach, and as written verbalization reduces framing effects,210 so does the act
of writing a judicial opinion provide valuable discipline on the process of
deciding a case.
But a moment’s reflection reveals this to be an incomplete depiction. The
doing of law is replete with situations in which judges must make decisions
based on complex, multifaceted inputs, subject to a host of competing consider-
ations.211 Does the potential prejudicial impact of this evidence substantially
outweigh its probative value?212 Do the equities of the situation support the
imposition of a temporary restraining order?213 These judgments look more like
facial recognition than syllogistic reasoning. The sorts of decisions involved
require something along the lines of a conclusion about empirical reality, yet
208. See generally Paul Gewirtz, On “I Know It When I See It,” 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1025 (1996)
(noting the traditional understanding that “the exercise of judicial power is not legitimate if it is based
on a judge’s personal preferences rather than law that precedes the case, on subjective will rather than
objective analysis, on emotion rather than reasoned reflection”).
209. “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover 1991) (1881).
210. See supra section III.D.3.
211. The extent to which such decisions do and ought to occur in law are the subjects of much
debate. See Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
231, 235–52 (1990) (providing critical analyses of the jurisprudential and proceduralist debates relating
to judicial discretion). Drawing on some of the same psychological research as this Article, Chris
Guthrie, Andrew Wistrich, and Jeff Rachlinski concluded that “the judges [they] tested . . . largely based
their judgments on intuition, but also demonstrated some ability to override intuition with deliberation.”
Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 28
(2007). They suggest that judges, like everyone else, possess both intuitive and deliberative systems for
making judgments. Consistent with the analysis here, they suggest that intuitive decisionmaking will
generally lead to better results in the context of the legal system, but conclude “that judges should use
deliberation as a verification mechanism especially in those cases where intuition is apt to be unreliable
either because feedback is absent or because judges face cues likely to induce misleading reliance on
heuristics.” Id. at 33; see also Hal R. Arkes & Victoria A. Shaffer, Should We Use Decision Aids or Gut
Feelings?, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 411–23 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds., 2006) (canvassing
research assessing the relative utility of intuitive decisionmaking versus that made via “decision aids”
and concluding that the latter are generally superior to the former).
212. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
213. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
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may be of the sort that are best made not on the basis of sustained, conscious
reflection, but rather via a summary, almost intuitive determination, perhaps
after having let one’s unconscious processing mechanisms sort through the
various factors under consideration. By their nature these decisions turn on
relatively inarticulable factors. Because both verbalization and conscious reflec-
tion lead one to focus one’s attention on the more concrete, salient aspects, to
the relative exclusion of other important considerations, decisionmaking suffers
in two ways. First, a judge acting in these situations will very likely not be able
to articulate all the reasons for his decision, making full candor unattainable.214
Second, he might be led to make a worse decision if he tried to articulate his
reasons because the act of providing a justification will lead him to overweigh
the articulable components of his analysis relative to other factors.215
Suggesting that these categories exist, of course, does little to illuminate the
question of which cases fall into which category. Most everyone would agree
that there are cases that qualify as “easy” cases. It would be considerably more
difficult, one imagines, to attain similarly strong agreement regarding precisely
which cases are the “easy” ones. A parallel dynamic would hold with respect to
the distinction between positive justification and negative justification, stem-
ming largely from the difficulties involved in determining whether one judicial
decision is better than another. The psychological research on which I have
drawn involved problem solving and decisionmaking undertaken in situations
where the subject’s performance could be objectively assessed. That is to say,
there were some answers that were incontrovertibly better than others. Unad-
dressed is the question of whether and to what extent verbalization affects the
quality of one’s approach to things like policy questions that have no accepted
correct answers. Some judicial decisions relate more closely to the research,
such as those that require findings of historical fact. There is, after all, some
objectively correct, if unverifiable, answer to the question “what happened?”
and it may be the sort of answer best reached through a process that gives full
play to assessments of things like witness credibility which are best performed
without verbalization. In addition, the sorts of context-bound determinations
judges must often make during the course of litigation, such as those relating to
the admissibility of evidence, also seem likely to require consideration of a
large range of complex inputs. The application of an established legal standard
to a given set of facts presents a similar dynamic, in that one can reasonably and
214. For discussion of the importance of candor in judicial decisionmaking, see supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
215. The effect could perhaps be understood as the availability, or salience, heuristic operating at a
micro level. The act of putting a rationale or decision factors into writing makes them more salient to
the decisionmaker relative to other factors or analytical paths, thus leading the decisionmaker to
overweigh them. For a description of the availability and salience heuristics, see Russell Korobkin &
Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 800 (2004). For a
discussion of the potential negative influence of the availability heuristic on judicial decisionmaking,
see Frederich Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 895–97 (2006).
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meaningfully speak of a “best” answer to the question whether set of facts X
triggers the application of rule of law Y.
The same may not hold if the question concerns the appropriate content of a
rule of law, despite the fact that determining the answer to such a question
requires the balancing of complex social considerations that might be no more
articulable than a full account of facial features. In part, this may be a function
of the differing aims of the two tasks. Much of the point of formulating a rule of
law is to generalize and to intentionally minimize the significance of the
particular.216 What is more, for these types of decisions there is typically no
agreed-upon way to determine whether the result generated in a given case is
the “best” possible result, or even if it is “better” than at least some subset of the
alternatives.217 Consider, for example, a court engaged in the process of statu-
tory interpretation. Reasonable observers can and do disagree over the basic
question of whether a court should properly take legislative history into account
in determining how the statute ought to apply in a specific situation.218 As the
millions of words devoted to arguing over this basic issue attest,219 the mere
fact of putting one’s analysis in writing does not ensure that that analysis will be
better in some ultimate sense. In similar fashion, a court contemplating the
extension of a tort doctrine must attempt to assess the likely consequences of a
legal change for the affected parties, prioritize those in conjunction with an
assessment of the various policy goals of tort law, and check all of that against
its conception of justice. In these contexts any assessment of decisional quality
may have to be qualified. Decisions justified in writing may not be better or
216. See Schauer, supra note 4, at 651–54 (suggesting that reason-giving is appropriate in contexts
where abstraction and generalization are desirable, but not where contextualization and particulariza-
tion are important); see also Schauer, supra note 215, at 891 (“Plainly the case-based rulemaker,
paradigmatically the common law judge, will perceive her task in terms of determining both how this
case and also other cases of this kind ought to be decided . . . .”) (emphasis added).
217. Judge Posner has suggested, for example, that the Supreme Court exercises virtually un-
bounded discretion in shaping the contours of constitutional law:
[T]he Supreme Court, when it is deciding constitutional cases, is political in the sense of
having and exercising discretionary power as capacious as a legislature’s. It cannot abdicate
that power, for there is nothing on which to draw to decide constitutional cases of any novelty
other than discretionary judgment. To such cases the constitutional text and history, and the
pronouncements in past opinions, do not speak clearly. Such cases occupy a broad open area
where the conventional legal materials of decision run out and the Justices, deprived of those
crutches, have to make a discretionary call.
Richard A. Posner, Foreword, A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 40 (2005). But he also disclaims
any ability to discern whether any particular exercise of this discretion is better than the alternatives.
“The problem . . . is that there are certain to be equally articulate, ‘reasonable’ people who disagree and
can offer plausible reasons for their disagreement, and there will be no common metric that will enable
a disinterested observer (if there is such a person) to decide who is right.” Id. at 41.
218. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpretation of Statutes, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 83, at 200–08 (presenting a brief history of the development
of statutory interpretation since the 1890’s).
219. For a brief overview of the debate, see Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435,
1461–64 (2007).
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more accurate in some global sense. On the other hand, they also will not be
worse, and they might be better on their own terms. If, for example, I am a
judge who takes the position that the only legitimate way to interpret a statute is
to focus on the text, perhaps I will do a better job of textual analysis if I am
forced to articulate that analysis in a written opinion than if I am not.
This problem of determining in which of the three categories a given decision
falls has another aspect, namely that even were there agreement on the location
of the boundaries between the three categories, there may be no reliable way to
make an ex ante determination of which category a particular case falls into. A
judge might, for example, initially believe that a given case is “easy” and
therefore involves pure decision: the law seems clear, as does its application.
But as she starts to write, she may conclude that her initial judgment was
wrong, and that the decision she thought was obvious is instead wrong or more
nuanced. She might find, in other words, that the process of justification is
affecting the process of decision.
In a world in which a written opinion will have either a positive effect or no
effect on the decision with which it is associated, this sort of error would be
significant only if it led the judge to forego writing in a case where writing
would have a positive effect. But the likelihood of such an error could be
minimized via a blanket requirement of an opinion. One substantial implication
of recognizing the concept of negative justification is that it reveals the problem
to be more complex. The proper resolution of whether to issue a written opinion
requires not merely a determination of whether writing will affect the decision,
but also whether its effects will be positive or negative. In other words, is this
positive justification or negative justification? If it is the former, we want the
judge to engage in the standard form of legal justification, telling us, with
reference to the appropriate legal standards, what factors led her to resolve the
case as she has. If it is the latter, however, we would want something else.
Perhaps no justification at all, or perhaps a different sort of justification, one that
focuses not on trying to articulate the reasons for her decision but rather that
provides assurance that she reached the decision in the appropriate manner. For
example, in a negative-justification situation we might ask a judge not to
provide a conventional-looking judicial opinion, but rather a document designed
to provide some assurance that the judge has taken all of the appropriate factors
into consideration, but without any attempt to ascribe the relative weights of
those factors in the decision.
3. Implications
As the preceding discussion suggests, the practical implications of recogniz-
ing writing’s potential negative effects on decisionmaking are unclear. In part
this is because they are a function of normative determinations about the nature
of judging that are beyond the scope of this Article. To conclude that one
methodology will produce greater rationality or better decisions according to
some other metric is not to answer the question of whether some lesser quantum
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of decisional quality satisfies the obligations of the judicial role. Moreover,
because opinions serve multiple functions,220 the role that an opinion will play
in shaping a given decision will not necessarily be determinative in any given
case. We might, for example, conclude that an opinion is desirable in a
particular negative-justification situation because of the need to supply prece-
dent and enhance systemic legitimacy, despite the fact that the decision itself
would be in some respect suboptimal.221
Still, it is possible to make some generalizations regarding the implications of
the effect of writing on judicial thought. In positive-justification situations we
should prefer, and perhaps even require,222 written opinions, consistent with
longstanding intuitions that doing so will generate better decisionmaking. What
is more, to the extent we think it critical for judicial decisions to be made by
judges rather than, say, their law clerks, we should insist that judges themselves
write those opinions, since it is the process of writing that provides the desired
discipline on thought.223
Pure-decision situations, in contrast, present no apparent occasion to require
an opinion, at least insofar as decisional quality is concerned. If the decision is
truly independent from any subsequent justification, then by definition the
justification will not change the quality of the decision. As a result, there is no
apparent need for an opinion to be written by the judge as opposed to a law
clerk. The opinion’s function would not be to improve thought, but rather to
provide verification of the decision’s consistency with the appropriate legal
standards.
That said, one might still prefer a writing requirement even in pure-decision
situations, for the simple reason that it is impossible to know with complete
certainty whether what initially appeared to be a pure-decision situation would
turn out on further reflection not to be. On this view, the value of a writing
requirement would not accrue via its immediate effects on decisional quality or
accuracy, but rather because it would serve as a check on the initial mechanism
for sorting cases.224 Although the value of opinions for this purpose would be
maximized were the deciding judge also the author of the opinion (thus serving
220. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
221. This is, in a sense, a variant on the notion that sometimes it is more important that a thing be
decided than that it be decided correctly. Gilman v. City of Phila., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724 (1865) (“It
is almost as important that the law should be settled permanently, as that is should be settled
correctly.”).
222. See McGowan, supra note 66, at 555–82 (arguing that judges should always write the opinions
issued under their names based in part on the understanding that the process of writing will improve the
quality of the opinions and the decisions they reflect).
223. Id. at 555 (“Judges should write their own published opinions.”).
224. One can find traces of this position in prior work addressing the question of whether there
ought to be a default writing requirement. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 194, at 27 (opining that
there are enough truly meritless appeals, and enough pressures on the appellate docket, that nothing is
lost if these cases are decided without opinion); ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE
241–42 (1983) (suggesting that an opinion is always necessary to ensure that the court engages in
thoughtful review); ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 390–91 (1941) (suggesting
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as a check on the decision), here too one could justify delegating the function to
a law clerk on the understanding that if the clerk were to determine that a
decision simply cannot be justified, the decision would no longer be treated as a
pure decision.
Negative-justification situations present the most interesting challenge, and
not only because the phenomenon has largely gone unrecognized. Here, of
course, the potential result of the process of providing a traditional, substantive
written justification for a decision is a reduction in the quality of that decision
via verbal overshadowing.225 In these situations, both the notion of verbal
overshadowing and the Unconscious Thought Theory suggest that the best
decisions will often be those that are simply made, without even an attempt to
reason one’s way to a conclusion, much less to provide an elaborate justification
of that decision. On the other hand, these are not “easy” cases as to which a
decision is automatic. While it is tempting to romanticize the quality of snap
judgments made by judges without justification, it is also apparent that a
tendency toward greater accuracy across a range of decisions does not guarantee
the accuracy of any individual decision. As a consequence, we might prefer to
have some assurance that the decision is the product of something more than
whim. The Unconscious Thought Theory literature suggests that the benefits of
unconscious thought are achieved after the information necessary to a decision
is carefully absorbed.226 Thus an opinion relating to a decision of the sort as to
which writing is not likely to be beneficial—typically a highly contextual,
fact-bound situation—would do well to focus more on describing the process
the judge undertook in making the decision. Thus it ought to look something
like a checklist of factors that the judge has taken into consideration more than
an attempt to assign weights to those various factors.
One final point warrants mention. The discussion in this subsection has
focused on the potential benefits of written justification, in the form of an
opinion, versus no justification at all. As noted above, however, there is a third
option, namely that of oral justification of decisions. The research canvassed in
Part II suggests that the transformation of thought involved in providing an oral
justification may differ in kind and degree from that resulting from written
justification. We might accordingly suppose that oral justification will some-
times be more appropriate as a discipline on the decisionmaking process. It
might be, for example, that in at least some circumstances an oral justification
would be less susceptible to verbal overshadowing than a written justification,
perhaps because with respect to some types of decisions, the more sustained
attention (or some other feature) that arises from thought connected to writing
exacerbates the effects of verbal overshadowing. Were that the case, it would
that a short statement of the points considered and reasons for decision, rather than a full-blown
opinion, will often suffice for decisions made by intermediate appellate courts).
225. See supra section IV.A.1.c.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 172–173.
1326 [Vol. 96:1283THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
make sense to utilize a decisionmaking process incorporating an oral rather than
written component. For now, however, this must remain as speculation. The
psychological research on which the conclusions in this section are largely
based has not yet advanced to the point where it allows for even informed
speculation about the possible differences between the two forms of justification
in the judicial context.
B. OPINIONS AS THE EMBODIMENT OF PRECEDENT
From the lawyer’s perspective, the most visible role that judicial opinions
play is that of being the raw material of precedent. Indeed, any precedent-based
system that failed to utilize the judicial opinion, or something like it, would
look very different from our own. Parties, lacking access to the courts’ explana-
tion of their decisions in the courts’ own words, would have to ground their
arguments in different authority. At the same time, judicial decisions would
likely take on a different character, as courts would lack the ability to support
decisions with careful elaborations. As this suggests, the written aspect of
opinions interacts with their precedential functions in at least two ways. First,
the written opinion serves to convey information about the content of precedent.
Second, the process of writing affects the nature of that content.
1. Writing as a Vehicle for Information
The very notion of precedent—the idea that present courts are bound by their
prior decisions and therefore obligated to decide the cases before them in a
manner that is consistent with those prior decisions227—implies the need to
know what those prior decisions are. In our system, judicial opinions serve that
function. There is, to be sure, considerable room for debate concerning pre-
cisely how the mechanism of precedent works.228 Under a strict view, it is only
the ratio decidendi that bind future courts, with any of the rest of what the court
chooses to say in the course of its disposition standing as mere dicta.229 On
another view, what matters is not merely what the court said, but how it said it,
such that the court’s chosen formulation of a legal rule in a prior case should be
regarded as consequential in (if not dispositive of) a subsequent case even if the
language at issue was not directly implicated in the decision of the prior case.230
More realistically, lawyers and judges undoubtedly adopt both of these views,
227. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597 (1987).
228. See generally Larry Alexander, Precedent, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 83, at 503–13 (outlining debates over the scope and strength of precedential
constraint).
229. See ALDISERT, PROCESS, supra note 66, at 607 (arguing that it is a court’s “decision” rather than
its “opinion” that governs future cases, and that “the decision of the case will be measured by the
precise adjudicative facts that give rise to the rule of the case”).
230. See Schauer, supra note 88, at 683 (suggesting that, from the practical perspective of those who
must apply Supreme Court opinions, “it is not what the Supreme Court held that matters, but what it
said”).
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depending upon which suits their needs at any given time.231 Under either view,
the judicial opinion serves as the repository of the information to which litigants
and judges refer in subsequent cases in order to determine what the law is (or
might be).
Such a regime is not inevitable. One can imagine a legal system that adheres
to the concept of precedent but that does not utilize written judicial opinions.
Even in a system in which judges did not speak at all to the reasoning behind
their decisions, observers could still track the results in cases, categorize the
factual situations that led to those results, and, based on that information alone,
attempt to divine the principles underlying those previous decisions. Parties
could then make arguments to the court based on those patterns of results and
perceived principles and thereby seek to pressure the court to decide the case
before it in a manner consistent with its prior decisions.232 Such a system
would, of course, be much different and much more limited than our own.233
Unless their case was virtually identical to some past case decided by the court,
parties would be constrained from arguing from authority in the way that they
can now. Under the system of precedent as practiced in the contemporary
United States, parties can argue to the court, in effect, “You must decide this
case in a particular way because you decided a previous case in a similar
manner, and did so for the following reasons that you articulated in your
disposition of that case and that are equally applicable here.” Under a system
where the courts generate merely results and not opinions, in contrast, the
arguments would be much more limited. There, the most the parties could say
would be along the lines of, “You must decide this case in a particular way
because to do so is consistent with the way in which you have decided
apparently similar cases in the past.”234
There is an intermediate position as well. Rather than taking the time to
provide written opinions justifying their decisions, judges could provide oral
justifications. These, in turn, could be summarized or transcribed and thereby
used as more-or-less authoritative sources of precedent on which to base
arguments to subsequent courts. Indeed, the English system operates largely in
this manner, with appellate courts having traditionally ruled on cases extempora-
neously at the conclusion of oral argument.235 Such a regime would likely differ
from the contemporary American process in significant ways—the English
231. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 77–75 (1996) (noting that lawyers and judges
vacillate between broad and narrow conceptions of precedent as it suits them).
232. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An
Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 412 (1978) (“Rules ordinarily cannot emerge from an
outcome unless the reasons for that outcome are given.”).
233. See id.
234. See James Boyd White, What’s An Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1365 (1995)
(suggesting that a lack of opinions would deprive litigants and the public of the ability to state what a
case means “in an accurate and authoritative way”).
235. See Ehrenberg, supra note 7, at 1169–70. English courts no longer issue extemporaneous
opinions in the majority of their cases. Id. at 1169. When they do, the process is as follows:
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process involves vastly more protracted oral argument, for example236—but
could obviously serve as a mechanism for creating precedent.
Indeed, viewed solely in terms of their capacity to transmit information, there
appear to be no significant distinctions between the American and English
systems. So long as a system in which judicial decisions are issued and justified
orally includes some mechanism for recording the content of the judges’
explanations, it is the equivalent of the American system in terms of the
accessibility of the content of precedent. The content of the information con-
veyed may be qualitatively different in the two contexts, but in both systems it
is (at least given roughly equivalent storage media) possible for litigants in
subsequent cases to make precedent-based arguments to the court which are
grounded in the court’s previous statements concerning what the law is and, at
least occasionally, concerning why the law is as it is.
2. Writing as Facilitating Logic
Given the equivalence of written and oral (but recorded) justifications as
vehicles for conveying the substance of precedent, a preference for one system
over the other in terms of the precedent-creation function of opinions must
accordingly be based in something else. One likely possibility is that precedent
generated via a written opinion will be meaningfully different in nature than
precedent based on oral justification due to the method of its production. An
obvious point of difference might be substance. Law generated via writing
might simply be “better,” in the sense that thought connected with and con-
strained by writing will lead to superior decisions, however measured, which
will in turn stand as more desirable precedent. This is potentially a source of
substantial advantage and should not be overlooked. The bases for a possible
distinction based on the quality of the law, however, parallel those discussed in
the preceding subsection and need not be repeated.237
In addition to its effect on the substance of precedent, the written opinion
might also affect the form of precedent by affecting the way in which judges are
able to give reasons for their decisions. To fully appreciate this point it is
[T]he presiding judge will, with minimal or no preparation, present a remarkably organized,
coherent speech lasting from thirty to sixty minutes. The judge will typically state at length
the facts of the case and the issues that have been raised on appeal. He will explain how the
court is deciding the case and give a brief explanation of why he reached his decision, but he
will cite little precedent and will provide only a superficial analysis of the legal issues. Then
the other judges on the panel will describe their own independent rationale for the result,
providing evidence that they have, in fact, done their own thinking.
Id.
236. Id.
237. This is not to suggest that the quality of the law generated via a given decision cannot be
distinguished from the quality of the results reached by the court measured in the context of that case.
An opinion could conceivably create good law based on a bad result in the case before the court, and
vice-versa, but there is no reason to believe that the relationship between the nature of the process used
to reach the decision and the quality of the decision will differ as between these two qualities.
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necessary to take a step back. The act of giving reasons for a decision is the
crucial part of the creation of precedent.238 In doing so, a judge (or court)
commits herself to a higher level of abstraction.239 As Frederick Schauer
demonstrates, a court offering a reason for its decision necessarily takes the
question at hand to a higher level of generality by grouping the case before it
with all cases as to which that reason applies.240 It says, in effect, that its result
is appropriate because of the presence (or absence) of factor X. That, in turn,
implies a commitment on the part of the court to be bound by that reason in
future cases.241 The presence or absence of factor X in future cases will at least
presumptively require the same result in those cases.
Writing affects this process because it provides the writer greater control over
her output than speech provides the speaker.242 She therefore has more ability to
shape the manner in which she characterizes factor X. Of course, in a system in
which all justifications for judicial decisions were oral, a judge would undoubt-
edly view the task as more akin to that of a writer than that of a conversational-
ist and so would take care to choose words carefully out of the awareness that
specific words matter. Even so, writing provides advantages. The author of an
opinion has the opportunity to puzzle over language and to try out different
formulations and structures of the reasons given to justify a decision. Thus, one
can strive for considerably more precision in a written opinion than one can in
an oral justification (unless one were to write out the oral justification before-
hand). One can, as a result, do much more in the way of categorization, placing
this particular case within a line of preceding cases, and articulating rules or
standards that will govern future cases.
This ability to be precise is generally regarded as a good thing.243 Judicial
opinions are “performative utterances.”244 It matters not only what a court says,
but in many instances how the court says it. Subsequent courts, lawyers, and
private and public actors often parse the language of an opinion just as they
would a statute.245 The greater the clarity with which a court states the proposi-
tions that led it to its decision, the greater the certainty with which those who
wish to structure their affairs in compliance with the law will be able to do so.
The same applies to judges who must act in accordance with the law articulated
in those opinions and to lawyers who must make arguments and advise clients
238. See White, supra note 234, at 1365–67 (outlining the role of judicial reason-giving in the ability
to make precedent-based arguments).
239. See Schauer, supra note 4, at 638–54.
240. Id. at 638–42.
241. Id. at 642–45.
242. See supra section III.A.
243. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 96
(1959) (suggesting that “the test of the quality of an opinion is the light it casts, outside the four corners
of the particular lawsuit, in guiding the judgment” of subsequent actors in the legal system).
244. See McGowan, supra note 66, at 570 n.299 (quoting AFL-CIO v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 320
(3d Cir. 1986) (Aldisert, J., dissenting)).
245. See Schauer, supra note 88, at 683.
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on the basis of them. Likewise, a legislature that seeks to monitor judicial action
in order to determine whether to act in response will be better positioned to do
so if it can easily determine what the court has said. These benefits might be
sufficient to counterbalance any detriment caused by the writing process in
negative-justification situations. We might be willing to tolerate suboptimal
assessments of the appropriate content of doctrine in order to promote certainty
and to facilitate a stable regime of precedent.
But the precision that follows from writing may not be a universally positive
feature. The ability to give reasons, and thereby to make a commitment to a
higher level of abstraction, implies the ability to choose to what level of
abstraction to commit. Assuming that future courts can be relied upon to regard
themselves as bound by the reasons given in prior cases, present courts have the
incentive to decide cases on relatively broad grounds so as to give maximum
effect to their preferences. Writing affords a present court the ability to take full
advantage of this opportunity. The court not only has the ability to carefully
articulate the grounds for its decision, but also to include in its discussion
material that, while not necessary to its decision, it might use as “precedent” in
subsequent cases. The ability to give reasons that are regarded as binding also
enhances the courts’ power relative to the other branches of government.246 If
the executive must conform its conduct to the judiciary’s articulation of what
the law requires, then the judiciary can increase the scope of its control over the
executive simply by increasing the breadth at which it provides that articula-
tion.247 Here, too, a court’s ability to articulate those reasons in writing magni-
fies this effect. Thus, those who favor a minimalist approach to judging, in
which courts strive to decide only the specific dispute before them, might prefer
the English approach. The minimalist court leaves things undecided. “It knows
that there is much that it does not know; it is intensely aware of its own
limitations. It seeks to decide cases on narrow grounds. It avoids clear rules and
final resolutions.”248 The traditional English approach appears both in concept
and in application to lead to decisions on grounds that are, in general, more
narrow than is the case with written opinions.249
There is another sense in which writing may not be desirable in the creation
of precedent, which stems from the phenomenon of verbal overshadowing.250
246. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 44–45 (1993) (outlining the argument that treating judicial opinions as binding
law rather than as mere explanations for judgments enhances the power of the judiciary relative to the
other branches).
247. See id. at 74–75.
248. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT ix (1999).
249. See P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 280 (1987) (discuss-
ing the relatively more restrained, party- and dispute-focused approach of English courts as compared
to those in the United States); see also Ehrenberg, supra note 7, at 1185–86 (discussing the role of the
writing process in the difference between English and American judicial opinions).
250. See supra section III.D.
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Simply put, the verbalization involved in writing may lead the judge writing the
opinion to focus her justification on the articulable aspects of the decision to the
relative exclusion of its other, and perhaps more significant, components.251
This is not to suggest that written opinions are more susceptible to the effects of
verbal overshadowing than oral justifications. Indeed, the reverse is probably
true.252 But because the judge, as the author of a written opinion, has more
control over the process of verbalization, and thus the time and ability to
generate a relatively precise justification, any verbal overshadowing that re-
mains is likely to be magnified in the analytic processes of subsequent courts
relying on the opinion as precedent. Such courts will take the factors articulated
in the prior court’s opinion to constitute the entire universe of matters appropri-
ate for consideration, even if they were not the only factors driving the prior
court’s decision or are not, in some abstract sense, the factors that should form
the sole bases for decision. This sort of problem creeps up with some frequency
in the law. For example, prior work exploring the use of metaphors in judicial
opinions has recognized the tendency of metaphors to “capture” thought and to
lead those in the sway of the metaphor to focus on some aspects of a problem
while ignoring others.253 Similarly, the literature on informational regulation
highlights the need to be mindful in creating disclosure mechanisms because
when information is disclosed about a product consumers will focus on that
information to the relative exclusion of other features that ought to be just as
important to their decision.254
In sum, while a written record of prior decisions seems critical to a precedent-
based system such as ours, the question of whether that record ought to be
produced by the act of writing is more difficult. The process of writing may
produce decisions, and thus precedent, that are better than those that would
result from alternative processes, such as those generated orally. But writing
also gives the decisionmaker greater control over the language in which those
decisions are described, and thus the ability to define the scope of those
decisions with greater precision. This feature will serve as a detriment to the
extent that it leads to the propagation of decisional shortcomings that are
251. There are shades of the rules-versus-standards distinction here. As Frederick Schauer points
out, the process of giving a reason is implicitly a process of appealing to a rule. See Schauer, supra note
4, at 638–51. Rules are, of course, both over- and under-inclusive. Analogously, if I start to write I will
not only be constrained by what I can articulate, but might also become captive to the conceptual
framework based on which I have started writing, in which case I will craft an opinion that articulates a
rule formed from an incomplete set of inputs. Of course, sometimes this may be inevitable and inherent
to the process of making law; law by its very nature seems to require rules or standards that are
articulable to some significant degree. Just as we recognize that rules, by narrowing the focus of any
given analysis, will lead to suboptimal results in some portion of situations, so we might recognize that
the act of writing might have the same tendency, in that once I have started to write, I have developed a
considerable amount of inertia in terms of my approach to the problem I am addressing.
252. See supra text accompanying note 193.
253. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 10–13 (1980); Thomas Ross,
Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1071–73 (1989).
254. See Oldfather, supra note 85, at 780–87.
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themselves a product of the writing process. More generally, however, the
distinctions between written and other forms of justification have no inherent
normative valence. That is, one’s answer to questions concerning the appropri-
ate scope of the power of current courts relative to future courts and the other
branches of government depends to a large degree on one’s view regarding
larger debates concerning the proper role of courts.
The significance of the precedent-facilitating function of opinions will also
vary from case to case. Opinions in positive- and negative-justification cases
will generally serve as precedent in a straightforward manner. Cases falling
within the pure-decision category, in contrast, will typically involve the rela-
tively mechanical application of established legal standards to the facts of the
particular case.255 While it is perhaps not accurate to suggest that there are no
potential precedential consequences of such a decision,256 viewed as a matter of
degree, the contribution any such decision might make to the relevant body of
law will be minimal. One might as a result conclude that, absent a compelling
legitimacy-based reason to issue an opinion, the decisional process in such a
case can properly be undertaken without a written component.257
C. OPINIONS AS A SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY
Judges are very mindful of the role that their opinions play in legitimizing
their decisions. Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark remarked, “We don’t have the
money at the Court for an army and we can’t take out ads in the newspaper, and
we don’t want to go out on a picket line in our robes. We have to convince the
nation by the force of our opinions.”258 In a similar vein, D.C. Circuit Judge
Patricia Wald notes that judicial opinions “reinforce our oft-challenged and
arguably shaky authority to tell others—including our duly elected political
leaders—what to do.”259 The core idea is that the primary source of judicial
255. See supra section IV.A.1.a.
256. The most prominent recent proponent of this position is the late Judge Richard Arnold. See
Arnold, supra note 38, at 221–23. Judge Arnold’s position was, for a brief period, adopted by the
Eighth Circuit via a decision for which he wrote the court’s opinion. Anastasoff v. United States, 223
F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000) (“We hold that the portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that unpublished
opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under Article III, because it purports to confer on the
federal courts a power that goes beyond the ‘judicial.’”). The decision was later vacated as moot by an
en banc decision of the Eighth Circuit. Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
257. The debate over the propriety of unpublished opinions implicitly reflects this calculus. Some of
the arguments against the practice, such as Judge Arnold’s, have been rooted primarily in the
understanding that the precedential contributions of any given decision will never be so insubstantial as
to justify dispensing with a written component (which must, the reasoning continues, be binding on that
court in the future). See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 38, at 221–23. Others flow to a greater extent from the
assertion that the need to maintain systemic legitimacy supplies the primary argument against unpub-
lished decisions. See generally Pether, supra note 5.
258. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 706 (1976) (quoting Justice Clark).
259. Wald, supra note 82, at 1372.
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legitimacy lies in reasoned appeals to appropriate legal authority.260 As the
Supreme Court has put it, the Court’s legitimacy (and that of the judiciary more
generally), is based on “the warrant for the Court’s decisions in the Constitution
and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the Court draws. That
substance is expressed in the Court’s opinions, and our contemporary understand-
ing is such that a decision without principled justification would be no judicial
act at all.”261
1. Reasoned Elaboration
Of course, “legitimacy” is a slippery concept with many potential mean-
ings.262 In one sense, it might refer to the bases on which action is founded. On
this view, legislative action is legitimate because of legislators’ democratic
pedigree. A legislature can pass a law and expect others to comply based simply
on the legislature’s status: its members having been duly elected by the people,
the legislature is entitled to pass whatever laws it chooses, and it need not
provide (nor even, for the most part, have) good reasons for its decision.263 The
judiciary’s place is different. Although judges certainly could, and perhaps
occasionally do, act solely on the basis of the authority of their position, the
simple fact of having attained the status of a judge does not generally entitle one
to reach whatever decisions one pleases. Instead, we expect courts to tell us why
a given result is correct and to do so with reference to appropriate legal
materials.264
In a broad sense, this requires what the members of the Legal Process school
260. See ALDISERT, PROCESS, supra note 66, at 607 (“[T]he acceptability and vitality of the decision
are usually measured by the quality of the reasons that originally supported it.”). For a sophisticated
treatment of this topic, see Schwartzman, supra note 86, at 11–25 (providing an argument for public
justification of legal decisions).
261. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
262. As previous commentators have noted, precisely what is meant by “legitimacy” in this context
is not always clear. See Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV.
1395, 1397 (2000) (suggesting that legitimacy can be viewed in terms of general acceptance within the
legal community or more broadly in terms of general acceptance throughout the entire populace); see
also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Even More Honest than Ever Before: Abandoning Pretense and Recreating
Legitimacy in Constitutional Interpretation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 368–72 (contrasting the notion of
interpretive legitimacy, which stems from decisionmaking guided by legal standards rather than
personal preference, with legitimacy arising from a public perception that the courts are operating in an
appropriate manner); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 285 (1989) (noting the
distinction between legitimacy as used in political philosophy and as used in its sociological sense).
263. See Schauer, supra note 4, at 636–37.
264. As Schauer notes, and as the discussion in this Article has revealed, judges often act without
giving reasons. Id. Moreover, the typical depiction of the distinction between legislatures and the
judiciary in terms of democratic legitimacy may be overblown. See generally Christopher J. Peters,
Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1997) (arguing that adjudication is consider-
ably more democratically legitimate than commonly understood). Still, the expectation, as evidenced
above, is that judicial action must be based on reasons apart from the simple authority of the office in
order to be legitimate. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
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referred to as “reasoned elaboration.”265 The idea for the process theorists was
simply that a court must justify its decision in a way that is not merely rational,
but that also demonstrates that the application of the particular legal standard at
issue in the case before it is consistent with the application of that standard in
prior cases.266 This notion can be generalized somewhat. Whatever the criteria
by which one chooses to assess a judicial decision (which need not necessarily
include consistency or any of the other features advocated by the process
theorists), a judicial opinion provides a window on the court’s decisional
process and thus allows some room for assessment of whether a court in a given
case has acted in accordance with those criteria rather than pursuant to some
other, illegitimate standard.267 That window is not necessarily complete. How-
ever desirable full judicial candor regarding the reasons for a court’s decision
might be as an ideal,268 it seems unrealistic to expect that courts will consis-
tently reveal all the motivations behind their decisions, assuming it is even
possible to do so.269 Moreover, as the Legal Realists demonstrated, legal
doctrine often leaves plenty of room for a court to justify whatever result a
judge might prefer to reach in a given case.270 A judge unable to finesse doctrine
but motivated to reach a particular result might be able to reach that result by
manipulating the facts. Thus an opinion in a given case might superficially meet
the test of reasoned elaboration even if the reasons that are elaborated do not
represent the full set of factors underlying the decision. Opinions thus serve
only imperfectly to ensure that judicial decisions are legitimate in the sense of
being based in appropriate authority.271 Still, they provide some such assurance,
265. For an overview of the content and development of the concept of reasoned elaboration, see G.
Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change,
59 VA. L. REV. 279, 285–91 (1973).
266. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 147–48 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Jr. eds., 1994).
267. See MARTINEAU, supra note 224, at 241–42. For a discussion of the ways in which this is an
imperfect constraint, see LLEWELLYN, supra note 194, at 27 n.18.
268. See sources cited supra note 86.
269. See id.
270. See Leiter, supra note 83.
271. There is considerable basis for questioning whether the opinion form as currently implemented
provides as much of a constraint on judicial behavior as is commonly imagined. The basis of this
skepticism is the almost equally common observation that judicial opinions inevitably read as though
the case were easy and the result foreordained, even in difficult cases. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 194,
at 26 (discussing what he calls the “single right answer” style of judicial opinion). This is true of both
majority and dissenting opinions. See Jacobs, supra note 262, at 367 (“To me, most recent constitu-
tional decisions look like shouting matches rather than the honest and thoughtful explanation more
likely to engender the respect and willingness to obey that legitimacy requires.”). Others have tied the
capacity of opinions to constrain judicial behavior to the constraining nature of the applicable law: if
there are multiple ways to justify a given decision, or if there are justifications available for a range of
decisions, then a requirement that judges provide a written justification for a decision creates only a
minimal constraint. See Maltz, supra note 262, at 1400–01 (suggesting that “the practical significance
of the constraining function can easily be overstated” and “cases in which a judge is unable to produce
an opinion that will adequately vindicate his initial impression of a case (at least in the judge’s own
mind) are likely to be relatively rare”).
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certainly relative to a world in which judges do not have to give a justification
for their decisions.
2. Perceived Legitimacy
Another potential way in which opinions might help to ensure the judiciary’s
legitimacy is by fostering the public perception that courts are addressing
conflicts in an appropriate manner. This might happen in one of two ways. The
first is more generalized, in that opinions provide “the public,” or at least some
portion thereof, with the ability to monitor whether courts are making decisions
based on appropriate grounds.272 Thus in the context of a given decision,
interested observers can assess a court’s explanation for the decision in light of
their favored conception of how judicial decisions ought to be made. Ideally, the
decision will carefully reason its way to a conclusion, or at least provide
evidence of the court doing so. Opinions also contribute to a sense of legitimacy
by providing a basis on which to take action should an individual decision fail
to measure up. In that case, those observers can respond by appealing to a
higher court, attempting to secure a legislative response, or subjecting the court
to a public critique.273
This process plays out in a slightly different way across a broader range of
cases. While it might be difficult to assess whether a court has acted appropri-
ately in the context of an individual case, such an analysis becomes more
feasible over a longer run of cases. By looking at a court’s performance over
time, observers can determine whether the court really has treated like cases
alike.274 Relatedly, such a perspective allows for an assessment of candor, or the
extent to which a court’s stated justifications for its decisions appear to be the
actual reasons. A court in any given case may say that its decision is justified by
resort to a certain set of justifications, and it may be difficult to contest that
suggestion based on a single data point. But if the same court over a series of
cases offers the same set of reasons for its decisions, and if the decisions
themselves appear to diverge from the stated justifications, a different sort of
critique becomes possible. Now one can suggest that the articulated doctrine
needs to change because it does not appear to adequately capture all the features
of the cases that the court apparently deems relevant. Or, if one is feeling more
cynical, one can suggest that the court is acting disingenuously. Either way, a
court that consistently fails to match outcomes with its articulated bases risks
taking a hit to its legitimacy.
The legitimization of the judiciary via written opinions takes place on a more
localized level as well. Research demonstrates that the process by which
272. See Oldfather, supra note 85, at 790–92.
273. See id.
274. For a recent example of such an examination, see Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished
Non-precedential Federal Appellate Opinions: A Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-
Created Danger Doctrine in One Circuit, 81 WASH. L. REV. 217 (2006).
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litigants’ cases are handled is the most important factor in determining their
satisfaction with the legal system.275 Four of the key attributes affecting percep-
tions of process include participation, trustworthiness, respect, and neutrality.276
All of these involve, to varying degrees, assessments that can be affected by a
judicial opinion. First, a sense of participation is critical. Parties want to feel
that they have had a meaningful opportunity to present their position to the
decisionmaker.277 An opinion, simply by engaging with the parties’ arguments,
can provide such assurance.278 Second, assessments of the system’s trustworthi-
ness are based on perceptions of fairness and the extent to which the court takes
the parties’ arguments into consideration.279 The process of justification is
critical to this perception. By providing a reasoned explanation for its decision,
a court will, at a minimum, give the parties a basis for concluding that, whether
they won or lost, each side received an appropriate hearing of their griev-
ances.280 Third, perceptions of respect stem from the treatment accorded to the
parties by the decisionmaker. “[B]eing treated politely, with dignity and respect,
and having respect shown for one’s rights and status within society, all enhance
275. See Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on
Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 882–83 (1997). For a comprehensive overview of this
research, see Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got To Do
With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 820–26 (2001).
276. Tyler, supra note 275, at 887.
277. Id. at 887–89.
278. One significant function of judicial opinions, which I will call “participation reinforcement,”
has been largely absent from prior scholarship. The core idea here is that judicial opinions are a critical
component of the adversarial system. This is so in that judicial attentiveness to the parties’ arguments,
which is evidenced in a significant way through judicial opinions, also serves an instrumental purpose
in legitimizing judicial action. It does so by maintaining the incentive for the parties to bring fully
developed arguments to the court.
As I have argued more fully elsewhere, party participation is crucial to the legitimacy of adjudication
under the dominant conceptions of the American adjudicative process. See generally Oldfather, supra
note 16. This is so regardless of whether a court is engaged in “classic” adjudication involving a
bilateral dispute between private parties or “public law” adjudication of a dispute with implications
extending beyond the parties directly before the court. In either case, it is the parties who are best
positioned to supply the court with the information necessary for it to resolve the dispute before it. This
is not to suggest that the parties will always provide complete information. Adversaries may stake out
extreme positions and give relatively short shrift to those that are more moderate. Parties to public-law
disputes may not share the same interests and perspectives as the entire group of those who will be
affected by the outcome of the litigation. But even so, because the parties to a lawsuit will want to win,
they will be motivated to provide the court with a relatively thorough and complete set of arguments
and other inputs for its decisionmaking process.
The parties, then, have a natural incentive to provide a court with the information that it needs.
Decisionmaking that is responsive to the parties’ contentions will strengthen this incentive; decisionmak-
ing that consistently fails to be responsive risks the demise of the entire mechanism. A potential litigant
who does not believe that a court will meaningfully consider her claim as she conceives of it is not
likely to bring her claim to that court. She will either seek an alternative forum or choose not to bring
her claim at all.
279. Tyler, supra note 275, at 889.
280. See Jacobs, supra note 262, at 384 (noting that providing an opinion “may engender respect . . .
by treating the losing litigants and the public at large as deserving of an explanation”).
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feelings of fairness.”281 Particularly in contexts where an opinion is the primary
point of contact between the court and the parties, judicial writings have the
potential to convey the court’s respect for the parties. Finally, neutrality in-
volves an assessment of the extent to which the decisionmaker remains impar-
tial, providing neither side with an unfair advantage.282 Here again, an
appropriately crafted opinion can signal such an approach.
On balance, the legitimacy function seems to pull slightly toward written
rather than oral justifications. Indeed, the notion of “reasoned elaboration”
provides one way of defining what it means for one decision to be better than
another. That is, a decision that comports with the requirements of reasoned
elaboration, while at the same time giving the appearance that it is doing so,
would be preferable to one that fails on either or both counts. So viewed, one
might imagine that writing would always be preferable, because the act of
writing puts the judge into greater contact with the legal materials that are to
govern her decision, thereby enhancing their constraining effect.283 In addi-
tion, the greater control afforded by writing will enable the court to work more
effectively to achieve both ends. And of course the legal profession’s intui-
tions regarding the nature of proper judging seem likewise to support a general
call for written opinions in support of the perceived legitimacy of judicial
action.284 But there are counterweights. Most significantly, if one is inclined
to suspect that courts often mask decisions based, in some fundamental sense,
on something other than proper legal considerations, then one might question
the strength or consistency of writing’s contribution to actual legitimacy based
on the suspicion that writing also allows courts to engage in greater manipula-
tion. That is, one might suspect that it would be easier to “cover up” an
unprincipled decision through a written opinion than through a process of oral
justification.
That said, written opinions do not appear to be necessary to maintaining
judicial legitimacy in its more localized sense. Indeed, along some of the critical
measures, such as interpersonal respect, opinions might be comparatively bad at
enhancing the perception of legitimacy. The bulk of judicial legitimacy arises
out of the process of justification.285 So long as courts provide appropriate
reasons for their decisions, it would not, in general, appear to matter whether
those reasons were provided orally and transcribed or via a written opinion.
Indeed, small claims court judges routinely make decisions that are accepted as
281. Tyler, supra note 275, at 891.
282. Id. at 892.
283. There is another potential dimension to the constraining effect of writing. The format of an
opinion can affect not merely how a judge decides, but what she decides. Although courts presently
enjoy almost unbounded latitude in terms of opinion format, one possible mechanism for shaping
decisionmaking would be to make certain components of an opinion mandatory. See Oldfather, supra
note 85, at 794–801.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 258–64.
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legitimate despite the fact that they are oral and basically off-the-cuff.286
Of course, to suggest that written opinions are not strictly necessary to
legitimate judicial action is not to suggest that written opinions provide no
benefits. Here, to some extent, the legitimacy analysis overlaps with the other
functions that opinions are thought to fulfill. If, as considered above,287 the
process of writing enhances the reasoning process, then reasoned elaboration
might require written rather than oral justification, and judicial legitimacy
might, at least in some cases, depend on writing. Similarly, a written opinion
might be perceived as embodying a more thoughtful, and therefore more
legitimate, process, thereby suggesting that perceptual legitimacy might like-
wise be enhanced by writing.
D. TAKING ACCOUNT OF INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES
Despite the differing institutional functions of trial and appellate courts,288
and despite the somewhat different standards at the two levels concerning the
issuance of opinions,289 the literature on judicial opinions has failed to systemati-
cally address how these institutional differences ought to be taken into account.
The preceding analysis allows for the creation of a general outline of the
differing ways in which the functions served by opinions will be implicated in
the two contexts. To a large degree, it turns out that current practices reflect,
however inadvertently, an appropriate balance. Speaking broadly, we should
expect to see, as we do, fewer opinions from trial courts. This is because trial
courts will more often confront the sorts of context-specific rulings as to which
writing might produce a less-accurate decision, will less frequently be con-
cerned with creating precedent, and will typically have other mechanisms
through which to satisfy legitimacy-based expectations.
Of course, that broad-level consistency between the expected and actual
relative frequencies of opinions at the trial and appellate levels does not always
obtain once one sharpens the inquiry. Consider first the relationship between
opinions and decisional accuracy. Commentators have suggested that trial courts
ought to issue opinions with respect to decisions based on complex records or
the resolution of significant evidentiary conflicts.290 Those cases, however,
often turn on the assessment of contextual and other difficult-to-verbalize
factors that appear most likely to be the sort most susceptible to verbal
overshadowing and thus to fall into the negative justification category.291 Appel-
286. See generally John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An
Ethnography of Judicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467 (1988). Of course,
not all decisions issued by judges in small claims court are so regarded. Conley & O’Barr found wide
variation in the approaches adopted by such judges in deciding cases, which in turn resulted in widely
different levels of litigant satisfaction. Id. at 504–07.
287. See supra section IV.A.
288. See supra section I.C.
289. See supra Part I.
290. See supra text accompanying note 30.
291. See supra section IV.A.1.c.
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late courts, in contrast, are much less likely to face such decisions.292 Appellate
courts rarely engage with the underlying merits of a trial court’s resolution of
the sort of issues likely to be susceptible to negative-justification effects. Such
decisions are almost uniformly reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” or
“clearly erroneous” standard.293 Significantly, appellate scrutiny in these situa-
tions often reflects concern with the adequacy of the trial court’s process and, as
I have suggested, ought to be the focus of trial court opinions justifying such
decisions.294
The precedent-bearing function of opinions, in contrast, is implicated to a
much greater degree in the appellate setting than at the trial court level. The
articulation and refinement of legal standards is one of the two primary tasks of
intermediate appellate courts and is the predominant mission of courts of last
resort.295 The precedent-related functions of opinions accordingly take center
stage in the appellate process. Trial court rulings, in contrast, do not bind future
courts in any strict sense.296 For this reason, any precedent-related benefits
conferred by judicial writing are relatively less important at the trial court level.
That is not to suggest that precedential effects are completely absent. A well-
reasoned opinion from a trial court can certainly serve as persuasive authority in
any future court. A trial court’s approach to a novel or complex case may
likewise provide a template that serves as something of a de facto precedent for
subsequent cases.297 These possibilities in turn suggest that non-judicial actors
will rely on trial court opinions to guide their conduct.
Trial court opinions can also support the creation of precedent in indirect
ways, such as by serving as the mechanism via which trial judges participate in
the appellate process. Most basically, trial court opinions provide appellate
courts with something to review. A decision that is simply made unaccompanied
by any statement of reasons is more difficult to assess on its merits and thereby
harder to defend. In addition, trial judges enjoy a unique perspective because of
their position. They are the first to confront issues and can, because of their
closeness to the litigation from which a given issue arises, offer informed and
valuable insights regarding the likely effects of a particular legal rule. None of
this, of course, places the trial court opinion in the position of actually serving
292. Perhaps the most common situation in which appellate courts must make decisions that might
be characterized as involving the potential for negative justification occurs in the exercise of discretion-
ary jurisdiction. A court, such as the U.S. Supreme Court or a state supreme court, that has the ability to
choose which cases to take, might do a worse job in selecting from those presented to it were it required
to justify itself. There are, of course, other reasons for not requiring an explanation of a denial of
discretionary review, including workload implications and the likelihood that lawyers would attempt to
use such explanations in precedential fashion, but the lack of a justification requirement also makes
sense on accuracy grounds.
293. See MEADOR ET AL., supra note 18, at 222–85 (describing in detail standards of review).
294. See supra text accompanying note 226.
295. See DANIEL J. MEADOR & JORDANA S. BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 4
(1994) (“Error correcting and lawmaking are the core appellate functions.”).
296. See Lee & Lehnhof, supra note 36, at 168.
297. See Zaring, supra note 37.
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as precedent. But it does convey the trial judge’s input into the process of
generating precedent,298 and to the extent that purpose is better served via
written opinion, provides an additional precedent-based reason for preferring
written opinions at the trial court level.
Turning finally to the legitimacy-based arguments for written opinions, we
again confront a situation where the case for opinions is stronger in the
appellate context than in the trial context, at least as those processes are
currently constituted. This, too, is partly a product of institutional function.
Again, appellate courts’ institutional role is more heavily slanted toward the
resolution of legal issues, while trial courts, which must of course also rule upon
legal issues, bear primary (and in many respects ultimate) responsibility for the
resolution of factual disputes. To the extent that the former is thought to involve
relatively more and the latter relatively less application of logic, written opin-
ions would be more crucial to the legitimacy of appellate courts for the same
reasons that written opinions arguably stand as a better source of reasoned
elaboration.
In terms of perception, opinions are relatively more important at the appellate
level simply because they provide one of the few windows into the decisionmak-
ing process. Aside from oral argument, which is no longer available in many,
perhaps even most, appellate cases, and which is subject to stringent time
constraints,299 judicial opinions provide the public with its only insight into how
appellate judges go about the process of deciding cases. As a consequence,
absent a change to a system in which judges provide oral rulings from the
bench, written opinions seem crucial to maintaining the perceived legitimacy of
the appellate courts. Indeed, the ongoing controversy over appellate courts’
frequent use of nonprecedential, “unpublished” opinions in recent decades
demonstrates the extent of the link between written opinions and appellate
legitimacy.300
The dynamic is, at least in theory, different in the trial courts. The nature of
litigation in a trial court provides for more-frequent interaction between the
parties and the trial judge, such that the air of mystery that surrounds the
appellate court decisionmaking process is less present simply by virtue of the
fact that the trial judge seems to be more visible and more engaged with the
case. This is most true in the context of those cases that actually go to trial.
There the judge is a continuous presence, ruling on evidentiary objections,
instructing the jury, running the courtroom, and otherwise standing watch over
the process. The parties and the public can monitor this process as it happens,
thereby reducing the need for opinions as a check on substantive legitimacy or
to enhance perceived legitimacy. The greater range of opportunities for interac-
298. See ALDISERT, PROCESS, supra note 66, at 608 (placing the lower court along with the parties in
the category of participants who “have an all-pervasive interest in the case, an interest in the
error-correcting activity of the appellate court”).
299. See BAKER, supra note 194, at 109–10.
300. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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tion between the parties and the judge also means that the judge has means
other than a written opinion available to credit participation and to signal to the
parties that he is doing so.
But the typical process in the trial courts has also undergone a change.
Trials are said to be a vanishing phenomenon.301 Judges must engage in
“managerial judging,”302 pursuant to which many of the crucial decisions in a
case are made out of the public eye. In addition, cases are increasingly chan-
neled away from traditional adjudication and into alternative mechanisms
such as mediation, which has itself evolved in such a way as to decrease
parties’ satisfaction with and perceptions of the legitimacy of the process.303 To
the extent that these changes have resulted in trial judges being less engaged
with the parties, thereby making decisions in a manner that resembles the
manner in which appellate courts make their decisions, written opinions should
be viewed as more important to maintaining the legitimacy of the trial court
process.
CONCLUSION
There would be no small amount of irony involved were I to attempt to
conclude this Article with a detailed set of prescriptions regarding when judges
ought to write. The analysis has revealed that the questions involved are
complex and that the functions served by judicial opinions are implicated to
varying degrees depending upon a host of variables including the nature of
both the case at hand and the court charged with its resolution. What is more,
having undertaken this inquiry via a lengthy writing, I must remain mindful
of the possibility that my analysis might be subject to some of the very
cognitive shortcomings I have identified. Finally, there is the fact that our
understanding of the relationship between writing and effective cognition re-
mains in the early stages of development, such that bold pronouncements are
inappropriate.304
It nonetheless remains possible to draw some general conclusions. At a broad
level, the analysis validates the largely discretionary scheme of current stan-
dards relating to judicial writing outlined in Part I. There are simply too many
variables involved to articulate a precise, detailed set of rules for when a court
ought to be required to issue a written justification in connection with a
particular decision. Nor are the effects of written justification relative to oral
justification clear enough to allow us to stake out any firm rules for when an
oral justification might be appropriate.
301. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
302. See generally Resnik, supra note 16.
303. See generally Welsh, supra note 275.
304. See generally Mitchell, supra note 12 (cautioning against and critiquing the overeager exten-
sion of psychological research by legal scholars).
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That said, the analysis does support the identification of a framework of
factors that can facilitate more-nuanced consideration of whether an opinion
ought to be generated in a given situation and by what process. The psychologi-
cal research concerning the effects of writing on thought supports the conclu-
sion that judicial decisions may be divided into the pure-decision, positive-
justification, and negative-justification categories, as well as a rough identifica-
tion of the lines dividing them. Indeed, while the advancement of the psychologi-
cal research might ultimately support a more fine-grained categorization, full
precision is likely unattainable. For example, there may be no meaningful way
to precisely and categorically identify the sorts of “easy cases” that fall into the
pure-decision category, and to some degree its boundaries will undoubtedly lie
in the eye of the beholder.305 We can perhaps say a little more about negative
justification. An ultimate list of negative-justification situations would likely
include many of the situations that the federal appellate courts have identified as
not requiring the issuance of opinions, such as decisions concerning the suffi-
ciency of evidence, the exercise of expressly granted discretion, and the like.306
What is not clear, though potentially of great significance to the operation of our
judicial system, is the extent to which the analysis of indeterminate questions of
law is susceptible to verbal overshadowing. The possibility that efforts to
verbalize one’s reasoning in the context of such analyses will lead to conclu-
sions that are somehow verifiably worse than would be the case absent such
efforts strengthens the case for judicial modesty, such as by counseling in favor
of minimalist decisions and perhaps greater deference to the decisions of the
other branches of government. But such conclusions, if they can be reached at
all, must await the completion of considerable additional research.
In addition, the analysis supports more focused critique of existing practices.
For example, standards focusing on a lack of “institutional value”307 are too
vague, simply because “institutional value” is not a concept with any accepted
meaning. It should be replaced with the functional and other considerations
identified in this Article. Likewise, a standard focusing merely on complexity as
a trigger for writing308 is too general.309 A decision requiring complex statutory
analysis would certainly call for an opinion. A decision requiring the assessment
305. One likely point of difference will be between the new and the experienced judge, with the
pure-decision category being larger for the latter. This highlights another potential benefit of opinion
writing, namely that the process of writing enhances learning. For an overview of the literature on this
point, see Laurel Currie Oates, Beyond Communication: Writing as a Means of Learning, 6 LEGAL
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 1 (2000).
306. See supra section I.B.
307. See supra text accompanying note 41.
308. See supra text accompanying note 30.
309. These are mere examples. Other standards are subject to similar critiques. The Third Circuit’s
Rule 6.2.2 is ultimately so broad as to allow the court to dispense with an opinion in any case in which
it is affirming. The First Circuit’s rule is merely a statement of discretion, and standards referencing the
“jurisprudential purpose” of an opinion are no more helpful than those referencing institutional
purposes. See 1ST CIR. R. 36.0.
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of a complex factual assessment, in contrast, might not. Or it might call for a
different kind of opinion altogether.
As that suggests, we can also draw conclusions regarding the format of
decisions. One of the lessons of the Unconscious Thought Theory research is
that the sorts of highly nuanced decisions that are likely to be susceptible to
negative justification are best made only after appropriate consideration of all
the relevant inputs. Thus it may not be the case that we want to dispense with
opinions altogether, but instead that the opinions speak to the process by which
the decision was reached rather than to the merits of the decision itself. In
effect, obtaining the best decisions might require judges to provide something
of a checklist of the items taken into consideration.
Above all, the analysis suggests the need and provides some context for
further inquiry into the relationship between writing and decisionmaking, both
at the level of basic psychology and in the specific confines of the judicial role.
One significant aspect of that relationship that I have only alluded to in this
Article is the fact that it is rarely the case that judges, at least in the federal
courts, are the initial authors of the opinions that go out under their names.310
My analysis suggests that this should not trouble us with respect to pure-
decision situations, in which decision and justification remain separate, with the
former remaining a product of the judge.311 The implications are not so clear in
the case of positive justification. While the process of writing will improve the
quality of the analysis, if the judge is not the author, then it is not the judge’s
analysis that benefits. The resulting performative utterance,312 and thus in a
meaningful sense the decision, is not fully a product of the judge. Of course,
most judges are careful editors of the drafts prepared by their clerks. It remains
an open question whether the process of editing does or can impose the same
discipline on thought provided by authorship in the first instance. If, as I
suspect, the author and editor roles are not equivalent in this respect,313 this
Article’s analysis provides yet another reason to be skeptical of the manner in
which judicial practice has evolved in the past fifty years.
Our heavy reliance on writing in the judicial process might in a fundamental
sense be the product of historical fortuity. It has nonetheless come to be
310. See Posner, supra note 217, at 61 (“Today, most judicial opinions, including many Supreme
Court opinions, are ghostwritten by law clerks. Many appellate judges have never actually written a
judicial opinion.”).
311. See supra section IV.A.3.
312. See supra text accompanying note 244.
313. Most commentators who have addressed the issue view the processes as qualitatively different.
See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUDGES ON JUDGING 34 (2004) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist as asserting that
“[t]he line between having clerks help one with one’s work, and supervising subordinates in the
performance of their work, may be a hazy one, but it is at the heart . . . [of] the fundamental concept of
‘judging’”); McGowan, supra note 66, at 556 (arguing that editing does not require the same systematic
process of selecting words as writing and places the editor at a farther remove from the parties and the
dispute); Posner, supra note 2, at 1448 (suggesting that the judge who delegates writing responsibility
employs “a traditional method of avoiding having to confront the consequences of one’s decisions”).
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regarded as perhaps the central feature of the judicial function in America.
Given that, a more refined understanding of the role of writing in decisionmak-
ing is necessary not only for us to fully appreciate the nature of the system we
currently have, but also for us to make appropriate modifications to that system
going forward.
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